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INTRODUCTION
In the deep jungle that lies along the border between Thailand and
Malaysia are the graves of hundreds of Burmese and Bangladeshi mi-
grants. The graves were discovered by Thai and Malay authorities in May
and July 2015, near deserted camps littered with chains and barbed wire
cages. Some of the camps had been abandoned for many years, others only
recently.1 In the village of Tah Loh, local security guard Da-oh Saengmae
recounted a hunting trip during which he sighted a set of graves in the
jungle a mile across the Malaysian border: “I saw small stones and leaves
and branches placed on top. I was afraid. We all just got away from the
area. I knew it was the refugees – who else would be buried in the
jungle?”2
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1. Subsequently, Malaysian police discovered twenty-eight abandoned camps and 139
gravesites along the fifty-kilometer border in Perlis. See Malaysia Finds 139 Graves in ‘Cruel’
Jungle Trafficking Camps, REUTERS (May 25, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-asia-migrants-idUSKBN0OA06W20150525.
2. Jonathan Pearlman, ’I Knew It Was the Refugees – Who Else Would Be Buried in
the Jungle?’, THE TELEGRAPH (May 31, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
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In 2014, the U.S. Department of State ranked both Thailand and Ma-
laysia as Tier 3 countries for human trafficking. Tier 3 is the lowest grade,
reserved for states that are not making sustained efforts to comply with
the Minimum Standards to address trafficking set out in the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA).3 The consequences of a Tier 3 ranking
can include the denial of non-humanitarian aid and development-related
assistance.4 In certain circumstances, Tier 3 rankings also raise barriers for
countries wishing to enter trade agreements with the United States. On
June 29, 2015, for example, Congress amended legislation relating to “fast
track” international trade deals so that countries holding a Tier 3 ranking
were excluded from the fast track process.5
One of the reasons why Malaysia was ranked Tier 3 in 2014 was be-
cause the number of convictions for trafficking had fallen, from twenty-
one in the 2012-2013 reporting period6 to just nine in the 2013-2014 re-
porting period.7 Convictions are one of the more easily quantifiable mea-
sures of a state’s efforts to address trafficking.8 In 2015, the number of
convictions for human trafficking in Malaysia fell further still, to just
worldnews/asia/thailand/11641802/I-knew-it-was-the-refugees-who-else-would-be-buried-in-
the-jungle.html. In November 2015, Thai police arrested ninety-one individuals in connection
with human trafficking. See Press Release, Fortify Rts., Thailand: Human Trafficking Case
Obstructed, Chief Investigator in Hiding (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.fortifyrights.org/publica-
tion-20151209.html.
3. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–10,
amended by Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2003, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-7110 (Supp. III 2005), amended by TVPRA of 2005, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-10 (Supp. IV
2007), amended by William Wilberforce TVPRA of 2008, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-12 (Supp. III
2010), amended by TVPRA of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54; see Anne T. Gallagher &
Janie Chuang, The Use of Indicators to Measure Government Responses to Human Traffick-
ing, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH RANKINGS 317 (Kevin E.
Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2012); Seo-Young
Cho, Axel Dreher & Eric Neumayer, Determinants of Anti-Trafficking Policies: Evidence
from a New Index, 116 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 429 (2014); Alese Wooditch, The Efficacy of
the Trafficking in Persons Report: A Review of the Evidence, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 471
(2010).
4. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7107 (2000).
5. Legislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (“fast track” consideration
of trade agreements), the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
of 2015 (TPA-2015), was signed into law by President Obama on June 29, 2015. Ian F. Fergus-
son & Richard S. Beth, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions,
CONG. RES. SERV. (July 2, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43491.pdf.
6. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2013) [hereinafter 2013
TIP REPORT].
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2014).
8. Sobel writes: “[T]he number of prosecutions globally will indicate whether coun-
tries are making progress holding perpetrators accountable for what is both a horrific human
rights problem and the fastest growing criminal enterprise in the world.” Amy Sobel, What to
Look for in the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, HUM. RTS. FIRST (July 1, 2015), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/what-look-2015-trafficking-persons-report. For further analy-
sis, see Gallagher’s discussion of some of the problems arising from a “success by numbers”
approach to measuring progress in human trafficking, discussed infra note 160. Anne T. Gal-
lagher, A Shadow Report on Human Trafficking in Lao PDR: The US Approach vs. Interna-
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three.9 In April 2015, Joseph Yun, the United States Ambassador to Ma-
laysia, said that Malaysia was still not doing enough to combat trafficking,
and that the country’s leaders must demonstrate greater political will in
protecting the victims of trafficking and prosecuting traffickers10 Yun
pointed out that Malaysia was a relatively prosperous country with stable
governance and the rule of law, and that its efforts to address trafficking
should correspond with its capacity to address the problem.11
In the weeks before the release of the July 2015 Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) Report, various media reports suggested that Malaysia would be up-
graded from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 Watch List.12 Coming in the immediate
wake of the discovery of graves on the Malaysian side of the Thai-Malay
border, this news confounded anti-trafficking activists and human rights
groups. A bipartisan group of Members of Congress wrote to the State
Department, saying that: “they had seen no reason during the reporting
period for this year’s TIP Report that would justify moving Malaysia back
to the Watch List. If anything, the situation in Malaysia has grown worse.
Malaysia has earned its place on Tier 3.”13 Members of the U.S. Senate
wrote to the Secretary of State, expressing deep concerns about an “un-
warranted” ranking upgrade for Malaysia in the 2015 TIP.14 Within Ma-
tional Law, 15 ASIAN PAC. MIGRATION J. 525 (2006) [hereinafter Gallagher, A Shadow
Report]; see also Gallagher & Chuang, supra note 3.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2015) [hereinafter 2015
TIP REPORT].
10. Jason Szep & Matt Spetalnick, Special Report: State Department Watered Down
Human Trafficking Report, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2015, 7:30 PM) [hereinafter Szep, Special Re-
port], http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-humantrafficking-disputes-special-idUSKCN0Q8
21Y20150803; see also H.R. Con. Res. 65, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/65/text.
11. Personal Correspondence with U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (Apr. 22, 2016) (on
file with author).
12. Jason Szep, Rights Groups Urge U.S. to Reconsider Malaysia Human-Trafficking
Rating, REUTERS (July 9, 2015, 6:33 PM) [hereinafter Szep, Rights Groups Urge U.S. to Re-
consider], http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/us-usa-malaysia-trafficking-idUSKCN
0PJ2PK20150709; Press Release, The Malaysian Bar, Untimely and Unwarranted Upgrade in
the Trafficking in Persons Report Compromises the Fight Against Human Trafficking (July
22, 2015, 4:05 PM), http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/press_statements/press_release_%7C_
untimely_and_unwarranted_upgrade_in_the_trafficking_in_persons_report_compromises_
the_fight_against_human_trafficking.html.
13. Press Release, Ways and Means Committee Democrats, 160 Members of Congress
Call on State Department to Not Upgrade Malaysia Ranking in 2015 Trafficking in Persons
Report (July 17, 2015), http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/press-release/160-mem-
bers-congress-call-state-department-not-upgrade-malaysia-ranking-2015.
14. E.g., Press Release, Bob Menendez for New Jersey, Menendez Leads Bipartisan
Senate Letter on Possible Unwarranted Ranking Upgrade for Malaysia in Human Trafficking
Report (July 15, 2015), http://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-
leads-bipartisan-senate-letter-on-possible-unwarranted-ranking-upgrade-for-malaysia-in-hu
man-trafficking-report-; Press Release, Rob Portman: United States Senator for Ohio,
Portman Cautions Against Possible Unwarranted Ranking Upgrade for Malaysia in Human
Trafficking Report (July 15, 2015), http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/7/
portman-cautions-against-possible-unwarranted-ranking-upgrade-for-malaysia-in-human-traf
ficking-report.
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laysia, proponents of human rights were similarly outraged. The Malaysian
Bar Council decried the possible upgrade, stating that, “[t]he lives of an
untold number of individuals bear silent testimony to the conclusion that
Malaysia has yet to earn any upgrade.”15 International non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) joined the criticism. Human Rights Watch released
a statement, which said that it “would be shocked if Malaysia were up-
graded . . . [t]hey have done very little to improve the protection from
abuse that migrant workers face. They have done precious little, frankly,
to merit an upgrade.”16
In 2015, Malaysia was one of twelve countries negotiating the Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal with the United States.17 Many of the
critics of Malaysia’s 2015 TIP upgrade drew a link between Malaysia’s new
ranking and the Obama administration’s imperative of including Malaysia
in the TPP.18 On August 3, 2015, Reuters reported that analysts in the
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (OMCT), who had
recommended that Malaysia retain its Tier 3 ranking, were “overruled by
senior American diplomats and pressured into inflating assessments of 14
(fourteen) strategically important countries in this year’s Trafficking in
Persons report.”19 The Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, De-
mocracy, and Human Rights, which oversees OMTC, denied these re-
ports.20 The Undersecretary pointed to several justifications for Malaysia’s
upgrade: Malaysia had recently drafted (but not yet passed into law)
amendments that would strengthen existing anti-trafficking legislation,
15. The Malaysian Bar, supra note 12.
16. Szep, Rights Groups Urge U.S. to Reconsider, supra note 12.
17. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Overview, MINISTRY OF INT’L TRADE AND INDUS-
TRY (last updated Aug. 19, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://fta.miti.gov.my/index.php/pages/view/73.
18. Nick Harmsen, Trafficking in Persons Report: U.S. Upgrades Malaysia in Human
Trafficking List Amid Protests from Rights Bodies, ABC NEWS (July 15, 2015, 3:09 AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-28/us-removes-malaysia-from-human-trafficking-list/665
4350; Dan Kedmey, U.S. Removes Cuba, Malaysia from Human Trafficking List, TIME (July
27, 2015), http://time.com/3973022/cuba-malaysia-human-trafficking/; Annie Kelly, US
Human Trafficking Report Under Fire as Cuba and Malaysia are Upgraded, THE GUARDIAN
(July 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jul/27/us-human-traf-
ficking-in-persons-report-under-fire-cuba-malaysia-upgraded; Carol Morello, U.S. Drops
Cuba and Malaysia from Human Trafficking Blacklist, WASH. POST (July 27, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drops-cuba-and-malaysia-from-human-
trafficking-blacklist/2015/07/27/e2a9bb1e-2a9d-4c88-b7c6-583eea3aa9fe_story.html; Matthew
Pennington, Kerry: Malaysia Trafficking Upgrade Not Due to Trade Talks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.ap.org/ [http://news.yahoo.com/kerry-malaysia-trafficking-
upgrade-not-due-trade-talks-113043991.html]; Jason Szep & David Brunnstrom, U.S. Softens
View of Malaysia, Cuba in Human Trafficking Report, REUTERS (July 27, 2015), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2015/07/27/us-usa-trafficking-idUSKCN0Q11LJ20150727; Jason Szep, Pa-
tricia Zengerle & Matt Spetalnick, U.S. Upgrades Malaysia in Annual Human Trafficking
Report – Sources, REUTERS (July 8, 2015, 9:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/
09/us-usa-malaysia-trafficking-exclusive-idUSKCN0PJ00F20150709; Hilary Whiteman,
Who’s Fighting Human Trafficking? U.S. Releases Rankings, CNN (July 28, 2015), http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2015/07/27/world/us-trafficking-tip-report-2015/.
19. Szep, Special Report, supra note 10.
20. Id.
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and the migrants’ graves were discovered in the jungle near the Thai bor-
der after the March cut-off period for evidence gathering for the TIP
Report.21
There is a well-rehearsed debate between critics and proponents of
the TVPA. Critics argue that the TIP Reports are politicized,22 that the
ranking methodology used is opaque,23 that the regime undercuts the
global anti-trafficking regime of the United Nations (the Palermo Proto-
col),24 and that sanctions are ineffective.25 Proponents respond that the
reports are an important source of data on trafficking,26 a useful tool for
21. Special Briefing, U.S. Dep’t of State, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Secur-
ity, Democracy, and Human Rights Sarah Sewall on the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report
(July 27, 2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/245294.htm.
22. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to
Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 465 (2006) [hereinafter Chuang, The
United States as Global Sheriff]; see also Trafficking of Women and Children in the Interna-
tional Sex Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the
H.R. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 1–2 (1999) (statement of Rep. Christopher
Smith, Subcomm. Chairman); U.S. Economic Sanctions: Good Intentions, Bad Execution:
Hearing before the H.R. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 105th Cong. 147–50 (1998) (statement of
Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Inst. for Int’l Econ.); Anne Gallagher, The 2015 US Traffick-
ing Report: Signs of Decline?, OPEN DEMOCRACY (July 31, 2015), https://www.opendemocra
cy.net/5050/anne-gallagher/2015-us-trafficking-report-signs-of-decline.
23. Gallagher, A Shadow Report, supra note 8, at 528-32; see also Nancie Caraway,
Human Rights and Existing Contradictions in Asia-Pacific Human Trafficking Politics and
Discourse, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 295, 298 (2005). Caraway provides the following
criticism of the early TIP Reports:
The subsequent 2001 and 2002 Trafficking in Persons Reports drew considerable
criticism both in the United States and abroad for glossing over state complicity in
trafficking, being vague on law enforcement details, and focusing solely on sex
trafficking rather than all forms of forced labor. The State Department report also
exempted the United States from evaluation, did not include data on the numbers
of victims in each country, failed to report the number of convictions, and did not
provide concrete information on sentencing rates. Of particular concern to activists
was the fact that the report did not indicate how many state officials were investi-
gated, tried, and convicted of trafficking: essential indicators of corruption.
For a more recent view of how the TIP Reports might be improved, see Anne T. Gallagher,
Improving the Effectiveness of the International Law of Human Trafficking: A Vision for the
Future of the US Trafficking in Persons Reports, 12 HUM. RTS. REV. 381 (2011) [hereinafter
Gallagher, Improving the Effectiveness of the International Law of Human Trafficking]. As
Gallagher points out, until 2010 the United States did not include itself among the countries
whose performance it reviewed.
24. Janie Chuang, Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global
Economy, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 137, 150-52 (2006); see also Mark Weisbrot, Who
is America to Judge?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2009, 6:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/mar/11/state-department-human-rights.
25. Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 439; see also Sarah
H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 86
(2001).
26. Press Release, Polaris, Report Spotlights Human Trafficking Trends in the U.S.
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://polarisproject.org/news/press-releases/report-spotlights-human-traf-
ficking-trends-us.
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international and domestic activists attempting to pressure states to in-
crease efforts to address trafficking,27 and that, in the absence of any
global enforceability mechanism to address trafficking in persons, the
TVPA represents a practical effort to shame, coerce, and pressure states
into strengthening domestic policies to address human trafficking.28 This
debate is one that has existed since the inception of the TVPA.29
This Article does not return to this debate. Instead, it seeks to extend
and deepen our understanding of the issues raised by the application of
unilateral sanctions to the problem of trafficking in persons. Specifically,
this Article examines whether unilateral mechanisms for influencing the
human rights behavior of states complement regional measures to address
human trafficking, or whether they in fact have negative effects. This is an
important inquiry because human trafficking, at least where it occurs
across borders, is preeminently an issue of regional concern. Addressing
inter-state trafficking requires collaboration between countries of origin
(from which victims are transported), countries of transit (through which
victims are trafficked), and countries of destination (where exploitation
occurs). The issue lends itself, therefore, in a practical way, to intergovern-
mental cooperation among states within a particular geographic region.
Institutions situated at the regional level possess knowledge of the eco-
nomic geographies that influence trafficking flows, and are in a position to
foster cooperative efforts at borders and in relation to the return of traf-
ficked persons. As Emmers and his colleagues argue, regional levels of
governance encourage states at particular levels of development, with sim-
ilar needs, to work together in enhancing their security, “with mutual con-
fidence in their other partners based on their similarities rather than their
differences.”30 This Article asks what impact the unilateral regime of the
27. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Says DOS Country Reports
Need to Be More Comprehensive (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-
releases/usa-amnesty-international-says-dos-country-reports-need-to-be-more-comprehen
sive.
28. Laura Shoaps, Room for Improvement: Palermo Protocol and the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 931, 960-65 (2013). Shoaps writes: “Due to
the Palermo Protocol’s lack of a proper enforcement mechanism, the TVPA has become a
standard by which the United States holds other nations fiscally accountable for their ac-
tions.” Id. at 971.
29. The TVPA was introduced by the Clinton Administration in 2001. The Clinton
Administration itself held the view that unilateral sanctions would be counter-productive. See
International Trafficking in Women and Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Near E.
& S. Asian Aff. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 106th Cong. (2000). Janie Chuang summa-
rizes the arguments made during debate on the TVPA as follows: (1) sanctions would impede
international cooperation “by causing governments to downplay the seriousness of their traf-
ficking problems in order to avoid the direct or political consequences of sanctions”; and (2)
sanctions would undermine cooperation between governments, local populations, and NGOs
because the latter’s attempt to raise the profile of trafficking would be viewed as a threat.
Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 455.
30. Emmers and his colleagues further argue: “Within the international arena there
are simply too many states, with too great a capacity gap, to allow for the swift resolution of a
particular problem.” Ralph Emmers, Beth K. Greener & Nicholas Thomas, Securitising
Human Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific: Regional Organisations and Response Strategies, in
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TVPA has on the regional approach taking shape under the auspices of
the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) and its recently es-
tablished Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).
There are three primary regimes that operate to influence the way
states in Southeast Asia address the issue of human trafficking. The first is
the global-level regime of the United Nations Trafficking Protocol. The
global regime lacks coercive mechanisms and operates primarily to set
standards and provide a framework for cooperation between states. The
second is the unilateral regime implemented by the United States under
the TVPA, which provides for sanctions against states that fail to meet
minimum standards in addressing trafficking. The third is the regional re-
gime evolving under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). In November 2015, ASEAN states signed the ASEAN
Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Chil-
dren.31 In addition, there are multiple voluntary forums, schemes, and
agreements, which overlay these formal processes, and which seek to fos-
ter cooperation in addressing trafficking. One of these is the ‘Bali Process,’
which includes all ASEAN states and key partners such as the United
States, Australia, France, and the United Arab Emirates.32
In Part I of this Article, I explain some of the current theories about
how and why states come to adopt human rights norms and then translate
these norms into laws and policies. In Part II, I set out the contours of the
TVPA and the global regime with which it coexists, the United Nations
Palermo Protocol. Part III considers how ASEAN States have responded
to the global anti-trafficking regime. Part IV explores how ASEAN states
perceive the issue of human trafficking. Part V describes how ASEAN
states have responded to the threat of sanctions under the TVPA. Part VI
examines the emergence of a regional framework to address human traf-
ficking. This Article concludes that unilateral measures implemented
under the TVPA disrupt regional processes and retard the internalization
of human rights norms about trafficking in persons.
SECURITY AND MIGRATION IN ASIA: THE DYNAMICS OF SECURITISATION 59, 77 (Melissa
Curley & Siu-lun Wong eds., 2008).
31. See Chairman’s Statement of the 27th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN ¶ 4 (Nov. 21,
2015), http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/27th-summit/statement/Final-
Chairmans%20Statement%20of%2027th%20ASEAN%20Summit-25%20November%20
2015.pdf. ASEAN was formed in 1967. ASEAN’s current members are Brunei Darussalam,
the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Repub-
lic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the
Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
32. See About the Bali Process, THE BALI PROCESS ON PEOPLE SMUGGLING, TRAF-
FICKING IN PERSONS AND RELATED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, http://www.baliprocess.net. The
Bali Process is a voluntary forum aimed at improving cooperation and information sharing.
As well as the ten ASEAN states, the forum currently has thirty-eight other members, in-
cluding the United States, the United Arab Emirates, France, and Australia. Furthering co-
operation on addressing trafficking in persons is also addressed within the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN-Europe Meeting (ASEM). See Ralf Emmers, Beth Greener-
Barcham & Nicholas Thomas, Institutional Arrangements to Counter Human Trafficking in
the Asia Pacific, 28 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 490 (2006).
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I. WHY STATES CHANGE
In the 1990s, Thomas Risse and his colleagues set out to examine an
important set of questions about the international human rights project:
What are the conditions under which international human rights norms
become internalized into domestic practices? Why is there such variation
in the degree to which human rights norms are actually implemented? The
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change put
forward a “spiral theory of human rights,” which showed how states be-
came socialized to human rights through a process that begins when states
make tactical concessions and cosmetic changes (which might include the
signing of human rights treaties), but which leads (under certain circum-
stances) to rule-consistent behavior.33 Risse and his colleagues argued that
when states make what they regard as ‘low cost’ concessions to domestic
opponents, transnational human rights networks and international critics,
the effect can be to empower and legitimate the demands of critics.34
What follows is a dialogue between governments and critics, in which gov-
ernments are forced to explain and justify norm-violating behavior.35
Risse and his colleagues argue that, in the process of justification and ex-
planation, states can become “entrapped” in their own rhetoric.36 The
more they are drawn into arguments with their critics, the more they are
forced to make further concessions and justifications, so that “a process
which began for instrumental reasons, with arguments being used merely
rhetorically, increasingly becomes a true dialogue over specific human
rights allegations in the ‘target state.’”37 In this process, the international
community supplements pressure “from below” (lobbying and advocacy
from civil society and other domestic actors) with pressure “from above”
(shaming, isolation, and perhaps sanctions implemented by international
actors).38 Risse and his colleagues argued that eventually, domestic and
international actors may have sufficient leverage to pressure states to
make further changes, such as bringing domestic laws into conformity with
international norms.39
33. See generally THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DO-
MESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
34. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
33, at 25 [hereinafter Risse & Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms].
35. Id. at 28.
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 28.
38. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 15-17 (2009). Simmons has shown particularly clearly, in issues that
range from women’s rights to torture, how ratification of human rights treaties provides rela-
tively weak domestic actors with the resources and leverage to pressure governments towards
human rights reform.
39. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 3 (Thomas Risse, Stephen
C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013). Risse and his colleagues describe the stage where
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The final stage of the spiral model, where states consistently comply
with human rights norms, is characterized by lasting behavioral change.
That is, states comply with norms even when there is no material incentive
to do so. Rule-consistent behavior occurs when norms are internalized and
become part of how states define themselves (the identity of states).40 At
this stage, ideas about human rights are regarded as right and appropriate,
requiring no further justification in order to secure compliance.41 Risse
and his colleagues argue that the processes underpinning this final stage
include communication, interaction, argumentation, and advocacy, which
all help to transform instrumental commitments into lasting preference
change.42
domestic laws are brought into conformity with international laws as ‘prescriptive status.’
“Prescriptive status” means “that the actors involved regularly refer to human rights norms
to describe and comment on their own behavior and that of others.” Risse & Sikkink, The
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms, supra note 34, at 29. Risse and his col-
leagues argue that during the prescriptive status stage, governments adhere to the validity of
human rights norms even when there is no material reason for them to do so. Evidence that a
norm has assumed prescriptive status might include the ratification of international human
rights conventions and their optional protocols, the institutionalization of norms in the con-
stitution or in domestic law, the establishment of mechanisms for citizens to complain about
human rights violations, and the government’s open acknowledgment of the validity of
human rights norms. Id. at 29-31; Risse & Ropp, supra, at 6-7.
40. See Kai Alderson, Making Sense of State Socialization, 27 REV. INT. STUD. 415, 417
(2001). As a recent example of this, one could point to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
exhortation to her fellow Germans in August 2015 to show compassion to refugees fleeing
the Middle East and arriving in the thousands off the shores of Europe. “[T]he humane and
dignified treatment of every single person who comes to us is part of the self-image which
represents Germany. . . . There is no tolerance for people who question the dignity of others;
there is no tolerance for those who are not willing to help.” Ken Bredemeier, Merkel Faces
Down Jeering Anti-Immigrant Protesters, VOICE AM. (Aug. 26, 2015), www.voanews.com/
content/german-chancellor-to-visit-asylum-center-hit-by-far-right-riots/2932711.html.
41. The theories I have sketched above each in different ways draw upon individual-
level psychology (shame, social status, material reward) to explain what motivates macro-
level state practices. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 206-07 (2004).
The anthropomorphism of constructivist scholarship has several critics. See, e.g., Jose Alva-
rez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 969 (2005). Jose Alvarez calls theories about
socialization ‘pop psychology.’ Skeptics such as Alvarez wonder whether people are really an
appropriate metaphor for states, and how we can tell whether or not states are internalizing
patterns of behavior or ideas about the appropriateness of norms and expectations about
actions. Alvarez argues that “states (or “organizations” in the abstract) do not ‘socialize’;
people do.” For a response to some of the criticism, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges,
54 DUKE L.J. 983 (2005). In addition, see the earlier work of Goodman and Jinks, Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
42. See Risse & Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms,
supra note 34, at 34; see also JUTTA BRUNE´E & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGAL-
ITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2010); Jeffrey Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and
European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553, 560 (2001); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen,
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 INT’L ORG. 943, 945 (1998);
Harald Mu¨ller, Arguing, Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory
and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 395, 403
(2004).
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However, The Power of Human Rights left several key questions un-
answered. The stage between tactical concessions and rule-consistent be-
havior, for example, was under explained.43 In 2013, Risse and his
colleagues revisited the question of what moves states from commitment
to compliance.44 The Persistent Power of Human Rights addresses ques-
tions such as: Why do some states remain frozen at the stage of tactical
concessions and not progress to rule-consistent behavior? How critical is
the role of independent domestic authorities, such as courts, in supporting
the transformation from commitment to compliance? What are the precise
ways in which external sources of pressure, such as social shaming and
sanctions, work to move states from tactical concessions to principled ac-
tion? Are external processes always complementary to domestic
processes, or are there circumstances in which external processes might be
counter-productive?
The last question is taken up by Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks in
their contribution to The Persistent Power of Human Rights.45 Goodman
and Jinks suggest that, under certain circumstances, combining mecha-
nisms can reduce the overall effect to levels below what any individual
mechanism could have achieved in isolation.46 Focusing on the timing and
interaction of different mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks argue that strate-
gies based on material inducement may be incompatible with socialization
strategies and that material rewards or punishment may “crowd out” in-
trinsic motivation for engaging in proscribed behavior.47 Using the lan-
guage of compliance scholarship, their argument is that the result of
interaction between the logic of consequences (which operate during the
early stages of the spiral model and leads states to commit to human rights
norms), and the logic of appropriateness or persuasion (associated with
compliance), are unpredictable.48 Tactical concessions might not always
43. Beth Simmons, From Ratification to Compliance, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 43, 57.
44. THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 39.
45. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Social Mechanisms to Promote International
Human Rights, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 103, 104-05.
46. Id. at 105.
47. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 589
(2001). Frey and Jegen demonstrate that the ‘crowding-out effect’ referred to by Goodman
and Jinks has been observed in many different areas of the economy and society. They iden-
tify the crowding out effect as one of the most important anomalies in economics, “as it
suggests the opposite of the most fundamental economic ‘law’, that raising monetary incen-
tives increases supply.” Id. at 590. The evidence presented by Frey and Jegen suggests that
“under relevant circumstances, it is therefore not advisable to use the price mechanism to
elicit a higher supply, and one should moreover rely on a quite different type of incentive,
namely intrinsic motivation.” Id.
48. The logic of appropriateness and the logic of persuasion are not the same thing.
The logic of appropriateness is associated with sociological institutionalism. It occurs when
actors follow rules that “associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching
individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and
choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations.” March & Olsen, supra
note 42, at 951. The logic of persuasion, or argumentation, usually takes place before this,
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lead to rule-compliant behavior, and in some cases, coercing states into
making instrumental concessions might actually be destructive to the
longer-term and deeper change that might result from other processes.
This is a matter of practical concern for those who aim to secure rule-
compliant behavior from states. Most human rights policies, projects, and
campaigns are based on the assumption that securing tactical concessions
is a useful and legitimate first stage in the process of promoting change.
Goodman and Jinks argue that things are far more complicated.
II. THE GLOBAL REGIME TO PREVENT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
There seems to be, at least at the level of rhetoric, a global consensus
that trafficking is a moral evil and that states have a duty to prevent it and
to protect its victims.49 Trafficking, as defined in the 2000 United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children (the Trafficking Protocol),50 involves the
prominent violation of a range of individual civil liberties including: the
prohibitions against slavery, servitude, and compulsory labor; liberty and
security of the person, and, potentially, life.51
The Trafficking Protocol is the centerpiece of the global effort to end
human trafficking.52 The major elements of the Protocol are as follows.
when actors are trying to work out what path of behavior to follow. Risse argues that where
the logic of persuasion is operating, actors use collective communicative processes to deter-
mine whether cause-and-effect relationships are correct, whether norms of appropriate be-
havior can be justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances. Thomas Risse,
“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 4-5 (2000).
49. See Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking
Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609 (2014) (referring to several public campaigns, including “Walk
Free” and “Give to Not for Sale”); I Believe in a World Where Everyone Can Walk Free,
WALK FREE (2016), https://www.walkfree.org/a-world-without-slavery/ (enabling readers to
enter their contact information and sign a pledge committing to the abolition of slavery);
Give to Not for Sale, NOT FOR SALE (2016), https://www.notforsalecampaign.org/donate/ (en-
abling readers to make a donation and “give freedom”).
50. G.A. Res. 55/25, annex, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
See generally ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
(2010).
51. Lorna McGregor, Applying the Definition of Torture to the Acts of Non-State Ac-
tors: The Case of Trafficking in Human Beings, 36 HUM. RTS. Q. 210, 239 (2014).
52. The Trafficking Protocol is one of the three protocols attached to the Transnational
Crime Convention. Article 1 of the Transnational Crime Convention defines its purpose: “to
promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively.”
G.A. Res. 55/25, annex, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,
art. 1 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Transnational Crime Convention]; see Anne Gallagher,
Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 975-76 (2001); see also Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labour, Doc. C182 (June 17, 1999) [hereinafter Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-
tion]; G.A. Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children]. Both the Worst Forms of Child Labour Conven-
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First, the Protocol depicts human trafficking as a complicated form of or-
ganized crime, systematically run by transnational corporate agencies.53
Indeed, the Protocol applies only to trafficking conducted by “an organ-
ized criminal group.”54 Second, in relation to the prevention of trafficking,
the Protocol places significant emphasis on border control.55 Third, the
Protocol attempts to distinguish human trafficking from practices such as
people smuggling and illegal migration by emphasizing the elements of
coercion and exploitation inherent in human trafficking.56 The Protocol
provides that consent is irrelevant in circumstances where coercion is pre-
sent.57 Finally, although the Trafficking Protocol encompasses all forms of
exploitation, there is an emphasis placed on sexual exploitation.58
The United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000)
(TVPA)59 was passed less than one month before the General Assembly
adopted the U.N. Trafficking Protocol. Like the Trafficking Protocol, the
TVPA has two primary purposes: combatting human trafficking (largely
tion and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children are examples of other international
instruments the United Nations has adopted addressing trafficking in children.
53. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 4; Transnational Crime Convention, supra
note 52, art. 2.
54. Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 52, art. 2 (defining an ‘organized
criminal group’ as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes,” a ‘serious
crime’ as “conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of
at least four years or a more serious penalty,” and a ‘structured group’ as “a group that is not
randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have
formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed
structure”).
55. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, arts. 10(1)(a), 11(1)-(6), 12, 13.
56. Id. art. 3(a); see Phil Williams, Trafficking in Women: The Role of Transnational
Organized Crime, in TRAFFICKING IN HUMANS: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DIMEN-
SIONS 126, 133 (Sally Cameron & Edward Neuman eds., 2008). In his market-orientated anal-
ysis of the problem of trafficking, Williams points out that the difference between alien
smuggling and trafficking is that in the former case, demand comes from the aliens who are
smuggled, whereas in the case of trafficking, demand comes from the entrepreneurs, busi-
nessmen and semi-legal enterprises that wish to profit from the trafficked persons. Id. at 128.
57. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 3(b).
58. Id. art. 3(a) (defining ‘exploitation’ expansively to “include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour
or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”); see
GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 50, at 984-85.
In relation to the issue of sexual exploitation, negotiations surrounding the drafting of the
Trafficking Protocol were marked by intense debate about the ‘forced’ or ‘voluntary’ nature
of prostitution. There is still a significant degree of contention about the characterization of
prostitution as inherently exploitative and thus inevitably forced. See Janie A. Chuang, Res-
cuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-Trafficking Law
and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655 (2010). Ethnographic studies of women trafficked for
prostitution highlight the complex dimensions of the notion of ‘choice’. See Larissa Sandy,
Sex Work in Cambodia: Beyond the Voluntary/Forced Dichotomy, 15 ASIAN PAC. MIGRA-
TION J. 449, 449-70 (2006).
59. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2000).
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through the prosecution of traffickers) and protecting the human rights of
trafficked persons.60
The TVPA contains a set of Minimum Standards for combating traf-
ficking, which require the government of a country to: “prohibit severe
forms of trafficking in persons and to punish acts of such trafficking” by
making trafficking a criminal offense; provide adequate punishment; pre-
scribe appropriate sentences in cases of sex trafficking involving children
or which include aggravated circumstances, such as rape, kidnapping, or
death; prescribe “sufficiently stringent” punishment for severe forms of
trafficking to deter others from committing the crime and to reflect the
serious nature of the crime; and make “serious and sustained efforts” to
eliminate trafficking.61 In order to determine whether a government’s im-
plementation efforts are “serious and sustained,” the TVPA delineates
seven criteria. The first three criteria measure government efforts in the
areas of prosecution, protection, and prevention. The remaining four crite-
ria measure the degree of international cooperation, including aspects
such as: investigation of severe forms of trafficking, extradition of traffick-
ers, monitoring of immigration and emigration, and investigation and
prosecution of public officials involved in trafficking.62
The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, located
within the U.S. State Department, publishes an annual Trafficking in Per-
sons Report (TIP), in which countries are ranked into “tiers” of compli-
ance with the TVPA: Tier 1, where a country is fully compliant, Tier 2,
where a country is not fully compliant but making efforts to ensure com-
pliance, Tier 2 Watch List, where a country is not compliant and the prob-
lem of trafficking is significant or increasing, and where a country makes a
commitment to take additional steps to combat trafficking the following
year but cannot provide evidence of doing so, and Tier 3, where a country
is not compliant.63 There is a two-year time limit for countries on the Tier
2 Watch List, and at the end of this two-year period, those Tier 2 Watch
List countries that have not made significant efforts to address human traf-
ficking are classified as Tier 3.64
The TIP Office “works closely with foreign governments to bring their
domestic anti-trafficking laws and policies into compliance with the U.S.
minimum standards.”65 For example, the State Department provides a set
of “model provisions for states to consider incorporating into their own
domestic legislation” known as the Legal Building Blocks to Combat Traf-
60. Id. § 7101.
61. Id. § 7106(a).
62. Id. § 7106(b).
63. 2015 TIP REPORT, supra note 9, at 45-48.
64. Id. at 47-48. In 2008, the reauthorization of the TVPA established a two-year time
limit for the Tier 2 Watch List because previous practices allowed countries to remain indefi-
nitely on this tier classification without incurring sanctions. See Gallagher, Improving the
Effectiveness of the International Law of Human Trafficking, supra note 23, at 383.
65. Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 467.
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ficking in Persons.66 The definitions of ‘exploitation’ in the Trafficking
Protocol and the Legal Building Blocks are identical, except for the inclu-
sion as part of the Building Blocks definition of “engaging in any other
form of commercial sexual exploitation, including but not limited to pimp-
ing, pandering, procuring, profiting from prostitution, maintaining a
brothel, child pornography.”67
In contrast to the Trafficking Protocol, which under the Organized
Crime Convention has no machinery for oversight or enforcement,68 the
TVPA provides for a program of unilateral sanctions against countries
deemed non-compliant with the Minimum Standards.69 Sanctions for fail-
ure to meet TVPA standards can include the denial of non-humanitarian
aid, non-trade-related assistance, and certain development-related assis-
tance and aid from international financial institutions, specifically, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and multilateral development banks such as
the World Bank.70 In applying the U.S. Minimum Standards, the State
Department considers whether countries are of origin, transit, or destina-
tion for trafficking; the extent to which government actors are involved or
complicit in the trafficking; and what measures would be reasonable given
66. Id.
67. See id. at 468. The TVPA defines “severe forms of trafficking” as:
a. sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coer-
cion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18
years of age; or
b. the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person
for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of
subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2000); see GALLAGHER, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TRAFFICKING, supra note 50, at 39 n.118; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
Model State Anti-Trafficking Criminal Statute (2007), http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/
docs/pubsafety/ModelStateAnti- TraffickingCriminalStatute.pdf. In relation to the complexi-
ties of defining sexual exploitation, see Alison Brysk, Sex as Slavery? Understanding Private
Wrongs, 12 HUM. RTS. REV. 259 (2011). Brysk writes: “Sex work is not always slavery; some-
times it is “freely” chosen as the best of a terrible range of options available to poorly edu-
cated young women in patriarchal developing countries.” Id. at 264.
68. The Organized Crime Convention establishes a Conference of Parties with the
power to review implementation of the Convention, request and receive information on im-
plementation of the Trafficking Protocol, and make recommendations to improve the Proto-
col and its implementation. Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 52, art. 32(1);
Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime on its First Session, U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2004/6 (July 8,
2004). Gallagher writes that under this mechanism “reporting rates are low and the informa-
tion received is uneven, shallow and often ambiguous. There is no opportunity to seek clarifi-
cation from, or for dialogue with, state parties.” GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 50, at 469.
69. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7106 (2000).
70. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 16 (2003) [hereinafter
2003 TIP REPORT].
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a country’s resources and capabilities.71 The object of the TIP Reports is
to pressure governments to institute policies and strategies to reduce the
trafficking of persons, using the threat of U.S.-imposed sanctions and the
shame attached to international approbation that follows a low ranking in
the TIP Reports.72
Anne Gallagher, an international expert on the law of human traffick-
ing, argues that there is no substantive difference between U.S. standards
relating to trafficking in persons and those that have emerged from the
United Nations.73 The indicators for both are largely the same and include
criminalization of trafficking, number of prosecutions, and the number of
‘victims’ repatriated and their conditions of care. Nonetheless, Gallagher
champions the Trafficking Protocol and is, by and large, critical of the U.S.
approach. In 2007, Gallagher produced a study titled: A Shadow Report
on Human Trafficking in Lao PDR: the US Approach vs. International
Law.74 In it, she argues:
[T]he US government, through its annual TIP report, has devel-
oped a unilateral assessment system based on standards derived
from its own national legislation and reflecting its own under-
standings of the problem and its own views on the best solutions.
Part One of this study has demonstrated that such an approach is
conceptually faulty, politically divisive and ultimately unpersua-
sive. It hampers international norm development and thereby di-
rectly serves the interests of those States that wish to weaken and
disengage from international rules, systems and processes.75
While recognizing that there may be some role for unilateral assess-
ments of a state’s efforts in some cases, Gallagher nonetheless contends:
[T]he impetus for development of an effective national response
to trafficking must come from within. Unilateral assessments that
do not derive their legitimacy from internationally agreed stan-
71. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7107 (2000).
72. See Gallagher, Improving the Effectiveness of the International Law of Human
Trafficking, supra note 23, at 392. Although she is in many respects critical of the TIP Re-
ports, Gallagher admits that “[w]ithout the Reports, our collective knowledge of trafficking-
related exploitation would likely be less; individual governments would likely have greater
control over the flow of information that properly belongs in the public domain; and even the
most egregious failure on the part of a state to deal with trafficking-related exploitation
would likely come at little reputational or other cost.” Id.
73. Gallagher, A Shadow Report, supra note 8, at 531 (“In several important respects
there is not much substantial difference. The US definition of what constitutes trafficking
does not vary significantly from the definition contained in the Protocol. Both sets of stan-
dards highlight the need for criminalization, victim protection, prevention and cooperation
with other countries. While the US framework of prosecution, protection and prevention is
overly simplistic, it does potentially have the capacity to capture most of the major interna-
tional legal obligations set out above.”).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 549.
626 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:611
dards will therefore never be as significant or as legitimate as a
judgment made on the basis of commitments voluntarily accepted
by Lao PDR and endorsed by the international community of
States. This is the value and the strength of international law.76
The fundamental distinction Gallagher perceives, between the U.S.
approach and the U.N. approach, lies in the idea that greater legitimacy
attaches to the Trafficking Protocol than to the TVPA by virtue of the fact
that the former was negotiated and agreed upon in a multilateral forum,
and then voluntarily accepted by states.77 Over the past decade, however,
the U.S. approach and the U.N. approach to the issue of trafficking in
persons have been conflated, both in perception and in the way that anti-
trafficking measures are undertaken, by U.N. agencies and NGOs.78 The
TIP Reports exhort states to subscribe to the Trafficking Protocol, giving
the impression that the objectives of the two regimes are identical. At the
same time, measures taken to prevent trafficking under the auspices of the
United Nations are often funded by the United States, meaning that, in
general, greater attention is paid to the issue of trafficking for the pur-
poses of sexual exploitation than, for example, trafficking for exploitation
of labor.79
76. Id. at 550.
77. See id. at 549-50.
78. The TIP Reports contribute to the impression that the TVPA and the Trafficking
Protocol have the same objective. The 2011 TIP Report, for example, acknowledges that:
The Trafficking in Persons Report monitors countries’ anti-trafficking efforts
against minimum standards set forth in the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000 (Div. A, Pub. L. 106-386), as amended (TVPA), not the UN Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Chil-
dren (Palermo Protocol), which supplements the UN Convention Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime. The standards in the TVPA, however, are largely
consistent with the framework for addressing trafficking set forth in the Palermo
Protocol, both in form and content. Both define trafficking in persons as a set of
acts, means, and purposes. Both emphasize the use of force, fraud, or coercion to
obtain the services of another person. And both acknowledge that movement is
not required, framing the crime around the extreme exploitation that characterizes
this form of abuse.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 16 (2011). However, as Chuang
notes, there are some critical distinctions between the two definitions. For example, the U.S.
definition places emphasis on trafficking for the purpose of “commercial sexual exploita-
tion.” Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-02 (2000); Chuang, The
United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 467. Chuang also notes that “though the
sanctions regime does not explicitly require countries to adopt an abolitionist position, the
combination of the funding restrictions and the Legal Building Blocks strongly signals to
those in need of economic assistance that the path to gold lies on the abolitionist side of the
road.” Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 470. The Trafficking
Protocol, on the other hand, emphasizes exploitation, which “shall include, at a minimum,
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 3(a).
79. Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 479-82.
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III. RESPONSE OF ASEAN STATES TO THE GLOBAL REGIME
The extent of trafficking in persons in Southeast Asia is difficult to
assess, seeing as the borders of many Southeast Asian states are porous
and trafficking may go undetected; citizenship and birth records do not
exist in parts of Southeast Asia, making it difficult to identify trafficked
persons; and trafficked persons may be reluctant to make reports to the
police because the result can be deportation.80 The extent of internal traf-
ficking occurs on a scale and magnitude that is even more difficult to as-
sess than cross-border trafficking.81 The United Nations reports that, in
2012, there were 10,000 cases of trafficking in persons in South Asia, East
Asia, and the Pacific.82 It appears that since 1997 and the Asian Financial
Crisis, trafficking has increased.83 Although charting the geography of in-
terstate trafficking flows is complicated, the overall pattern seems to be
that people are trafficked from Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Myanmar, into the relatively rich and developed countries
of Malaysia and Singapore, and (sometimes) further abroad to Australia,
Europe, and the United States.84 China and Thailand are countries of
80. See Ashley Blackburn, Robert W. Taylor & Jennifer Elaine Davis, Understanding
the Complexities of Human Trafficking and Child Sexual Exploitation: The Case of Southeast
Asia, 20 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 105 (2010). Alison Murray has shown how difficult it is to
estimate the scale of trafficking and discusses the policy distortions that result from reliance
on unsupported statistics. Alison Murray, Debt-Bondage and Trafficking: Don’t Believe the
Hype, in FEMINIST POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER 413, x-y (Reina Lewis & Sara Mills
eds., 1988).
81. Johannes Koettl, Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery, and Economic Ex-
ploitation: A Discussion on Definitions, Prevalence, Relevance for Development, and Roles for
the World Bank in the Fight Against Human Trafficking, SOCIAL PROTECTION & LABOR: THE
WORLD BANK (2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resour
ces/SP-Discussion-papers/Labor-Market-DP/0911.pdf. Koettl writes: “Nobody knows the
true numbers, but even conservative estimates suggest that at least 2.5 million children,
women, and men are lured or forced across international borders every year – and many
more are trafficked within their home countries – and put to work against their will, often
under deplorable and unsafe conditions, held captive by physical, psychological, or financial
threats.” Id. at 3.
82. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Global Report on Trafficking in Per-
sons, 69 No. E.13.IV.1 (2012) [hereinafter UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in
Persons].
83. See Ruchira Gupta, Human Trafficking in Asia: Trends and Responses, in ON THE
MOVE: MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL 69, 70-71 (Ellen Laipson
& Amit Pandya eds., 2010).
84. Pierre Le Roux, A Lethal Funnel: Prostitution and Trafficking in Women for Sex-
ual Exploitation in Southeast Asia, in TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR SEX IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA 111, 129 (Pierre Le Roux, Jean Baffie & Gilles Beullier eds., 2010). The Global Report
on Trafficking in Persons states, “in East Asia and the Pacific, most victims are trafficked
domestically or from neighbouring countries” and “Thailand detects a significant number of
victims from the greater Mekong area. Victims from the Mekong area and the poorer coun-
tries in South-East Asia are often trafficked to the richer countries.” UNODC, Global Re-
port on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 82, at 79. The greater Mekong area includes
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province, China.
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both origin and destination, and also places where internal trafficking
occurs.85
The engagement of ASEAN states with the U.N. regime for combat-
ing human trafficking has been equivocal.86 Brunei has still not signed the
Trafficking Protocol. Indonesia and Vietnam ratified the Protocol rela-
tively late, in 2009 and 2012 respectively. Thailand did not ratify the Proto-
col until 2013. Singapore did not ratify until September 2015.87 Although
the other ASEAN states have ratified or acceded to the Protocol, only the
Philippines and Cambodia have accepted Article 15(2), which provides for
the submission of disputes to arbitration, or failing that, to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.88
One explanation for the reluctance of ASEAN states to engage with
the international regime is the disjuncture that exists between the global
conception of the problem of trafficking, and the dimensions and scope of
the problem as it exists in Southeast Asia. Let us consider this further.
First, the Trafficking Protocol emphasizes the nature of trafficking as
an organized transnational crime. The idea of trafficking in the Trafficking
Protocol is usually described along the following lines:
Over the last ten years, the issue of illegal migration has been in-
creasingly linked to organised criminal groups that now largely
control the smuggling and trafficking of people. People-traffickers
and smugglers make high profits while risking relatively short
prison sentences in comparison with drug dealers. They are con-
nected to other transnational criminal networks involved in nar-
cotics, arms trafficking, money laundering and counterfeit
documentation and dispose over the necessary funds to purchase
modern equipment and corrupt police and other government offi-
cials. Their activities rely on complex infrastructures and are taken
more and more seriously by states.89
But there is scant evidence that the majority of trafficking in South-
east Asia is practiced predominantly as a systematic, patterned, and organ-
ized form of crime. Indeed, recent, ethnographically-oriented research
points in precisely the opposite direction. Molland’s work, for example,
carried out along the Thai-Lao border, reveals that much trafficking is not
85. UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 82, at 51, 72; Cheah
Wuiling, Assessing Criminal Justice and Human Rights Models in the Fight Against Sex Traf-
ficking: A Case Study of the ASEAN Region, 3 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 46, 52-53 (2006).
86. Blackburn et al., supra note 80.
87. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, at 3.
88. See id.
89. Ralf Emmers, The Threat of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: Drug Traffick-
ing, Human Smuggling and Trafficking, and Sea Piracy, RES. UNIT ON INT’L SECURITY AND
COOPERATION (UNISCI) DISCUSSION PAPERS 1, 5 (2003), http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/
76711296006.pdf.
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the prerogative of organized and calculating criminal groups,90 but is car-
ried out on an opportunistic basis, by friends, acquaintances, and sex
workers themselves, who recruit among their peers on visits back to their
village communities.91 The research of Derks, Henke, and Vanna, carried
out in the Mekong region, also concludes that trafficking is a “cottage in-
dustry,” involving family members, neighbors, and friends, and that no
specific studies have revealed the “criminal networks” of human traffick-
ers.92 The work of Thierry Bouhours and his colleagues, in Cambodia, also
casts doubt on claims about the high prevalence, profitability, and role of
organized crime in human trafficking.93 Bouhours points out that incarcer-
ated traffickers in Cambodia are poor and uneducated individuals, and
that 80% of them are women:
[Trafficker] activities are unsophisticated and conducted by sole
operators or small casual or informal networks. Pushed by a lack
of legitimate opportunities and pulled by the presence of illegiti-
mate opportunities, to survive they engage in trafficking for very
modest gains.94
Second, the Trafficking Protocol emphasizes the presence of coercion
as the element that distinguishes trafficked persons from migrants or par-
ticipants in people-smuggling schemes.95 Yet, in Southeast Asia, the cir-
cumstances of poverty, which cause people to move or make them
susceptible to being moved involuntarily (trafficked), severely complicate
notions of consent.96 There is a significant body of research demonstrating
that in many cases, at least initially, the ‘victim’ of trafficking in Southeast
Asia is a willing participant in a scheme that promises benefits, which
might be economic (work, food, housing) or social (in the form of chiwit
90. Sverre Molland, The Inexorable Quest for Trafficking Hotspots Along the Thai-
Lao Border, in LABOUR MIGRATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CRITI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES, 57, 57-58 (Michele Ford et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Molland, The Inex-
orable Quest]; see also Raimo Va¨yrynen, Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and
Organised Crime, U.N. U. WORLD INST. FOR DEV. ECON. RES. 1, 7 (2003).
91. See Sverre Molland, ‘The Perfect Business’: Human Trafficking and Lao-Thai
Cross-Border Migration, 41 DEV. & CHANGE 831, 848 (2010); Sverre Molland, The Value of
Bodies: Deception, Helping and Profiteering in Human Trafficking Along the Thai-Lao Bor-
der, 34 ASIAN STUD. REV. 211, 222 (2010) [hereinafter Molland, The Value of Bodies].
92. ANNUSKA DERKS, ROGER HENKE & LY VANNA, REVIEW OF A DECADE OF RE-
SEARCH ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, CAMBODIA 17 (2006).
93. Thierry Bouhours, Roderic Broadhurst & Chenda Keo, Human Trafficking and
Moral Panic in Cambodia: The Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions 24 (Am. Acad.
of Political Sci., Working Paper, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21
90704.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 3(a).
96. Blackburn et al., supra note 80, at 105 (“Over the past century, rampant poverty
and political instability has marred the Southeast Asia region and has undoubtedly led to the
infiltration of organized criminal networks seeking to exploit vulnerable men, women, and
children.”).
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thansamay, the “taste for modern life”).97 Molland argues that while there
do appear to be some cases of abduction, more commonly what occurs is
deceptive recruitment, primarily about conditions of work (which are
sometimes more restrictive than described) and earnings (which can be
less than described).98 In this way, much trafficking in Southeast Asia is
conflated with, or hidden within, the broader (and more difficult to pre-
vent) phenomenon of illegal migration.99
Third, it is not at all clear that, in Southeast Asia, the majority of traf-
ficking occurs for the purpose of prostitution or sexual exploitation. The
evidence would seem to show that exploitation of labor is at least as preva-
lent as sexual exploitation.100 For those migrating from Lao PDR, for ex-
ample, the largest site of exploitation seems to be labor outside of the sex
industry.101 Even in Cambodia, where there is significant evidence that
trafficking does occur for the purpose of work in the sex industry, there is
also evidence that equally as many persons, comprised mainly by men, are
trafficked into other industries, such as: “factories; the agricultural sector
and fishing industries, where they work in circumstances of actual or po-
tential exploitation; for legal and illegal work; legal and illegal marriages;
the organ trade, camel racing; and bonded labor.”102
Finally, the Trafficking Protocol places an emphasis on maintaining
the integrity of borders.103 Yet, many borders within Southeast Asia were
97. Id. at 115, 120-21; see Sandy, supra note 58, at 449. For an anthropological account
of motivations for voluntary migration, see M.B. Mills, Contesting the Margins of Modernity:
Women, Migration, and Consumption in Thailand, 24 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 37 (1997). Sverre
Molland discusses chiwit thansamay (Thai) and siwit thansamay (Lao) in the context of traf-
ficking in Safe Migration, Dilettante Brokers and the Appropriation of Legality: Lao-Thai
“Trafficking” in the Context of Regulating Labour Migration, 85 PAC. AFF. 117, 123 (2012).
98. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, Human Trafficking and Human Rights in Asia:
Trends, Issues and Challenges, in CROSS BORDER GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: REGIONAL ISSUES
AND MECHANISMS 219, 219–66 (Michele Ford et al. eds., 2011); Molland, The Inexorable
Quest, supra note 90; Molland, The Value of Bodies, supra note 91, at 222.
99. Didier Bertrand, Migrations and Trafficking in the Lao PDR: Contextual Analysis
of Sexual Exploitation and Victimisation, in TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR SEX IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA supra note 84, at 157, 161-64.
100. Blackburn et al., supra note 80; UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons,
supra note 82, at 34 (“In the other regions, the shares of trafficking for forced labour are far
higher than in Europe and Central Asia. In South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, trafficking
for forced labour is the major detected form of trafficking as it accounts for nearly two thirds
of the detected victims.”).
101. Susan Kneebone & Julie Debeljak, Combating Transnational Crime in the Greater
Mekong Subregion: The Cases of Laos and Cambodia, in TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
EUROPEAN AND ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 133, 137 (Leslie Holmes ed., 2010).
102. Id. at 140.
103. The Trafficking Protocol states: “The Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise
stated herein, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the offences established in
accordance with article 5 of this Protocol, where those offences are transnational in nature
and involve an organized criminal group, as well as to the protection of victims of such of-
fences.” Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 4. The Protocol supplements the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Convention provides that a
crime is transnational in nature if:
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imposed, sometimes arbitrarily, by colonial rulers. Prior to this, they were
‘frontier’ areas, where neighbors and family travelled and traded without
restriction.104 In many cases, the traditions of unfettered trade and ex-
change have continued, because states lack either the incentive or the ca-
pacity to stem unofficial cross-border commerce.105 In Hekou, for
example, where the Nanxi River and the Red River merge, and China and
Vietnam meet, tens of thousands of undocumented Vietnamese women,
many of them under the age of eighteen, enter China illegally by boat.106
In the Isaan region, where the Mekong River marks the border between
Thailand and Laos, government regulations on both sides make legal mi-
gration a “lengthy, expensive, and difficult process,” unfamiliar to many
people and avoided by most.107
The inadequacy of the global regime in reflecting the particularities of
the practice of trafficking in Southeast Asia might plausibly explain the
reluctance of states to subscribe to the Protocol. Yet, as the following sec-
tion shows, the majority of ASEAN states have passed legislation aimed at
addressing trafficking in persons. This legislation, without exception,
draws heavily on the text of the Protocol and the TVPA. This raises two
central and related questions. First, why, over the period of a decade, de-
spite the disjuncture between the practice of trafficking and the global
anti-trafficking architecture, have the member states of ASEAN passed
broadly similar legislation, consonant with international norms, directed at
preventing human trafficking and protecting the human rights of traf-
ficked persons? In the language of compliance scholarship, this question
can be put in the following way: what factors led to the decision on the
part of states to give international human rights norms prescriptive status
in domestic law? Second, what is the effect of global norms in these cir-
cumstances? Is the result compliance or rule-consistent behavior? If not,
then what is the explanation for this?
(a) It is committed in more than one State;
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning,
direction or control takes place in another State;
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that
engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.
Transnational Crime Convention, supra note 52, art. 3(2).
104. THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL, SIAM MAPPED: A HISTORY OF THE GEO-BODY OF A
NATION 73-75 (1994); Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Illegal Trades Across Mainland Borders of
Southeast Asia, in THE TRADE IN HUMAN BEINGS FOR SEX IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note
84, at 305, 312.
105. Kneebone & Debeljak, supra note 101.
106. Zhang Juan, A Trafficking ‘Not-Spot’ in a China-Vietnam Border Town, in LA-
BOUR MIGRATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 90, at 95–98.
107. Bertrand, supra note 99, at 158 (discussing the dynamics of inter-state commerce in
the greater Mekong region).
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IV. DOMESTIC RESPONSE OF ASEAN STATES TO
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Every ASEAN state has passed specific legislation relating to human
trafficking. Laos was the last to do so, with the National Assembly’s adop-
tion of the Law on Preventing Human Trafficking in December 2015.108 In
the majority of cases,109 the legislation includes provisions for the protec-
tion of victims of trafficking, as well as for the prosecution of perpetrators,
and references, to different extents, to the Trafficking Protocol definition
of “trafficking in persons.”110
In 2003, the Philippines passed the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law of
the Philippines, which sets the issue of trafficking within a human rights
framework and provides a broad definition of trafficking, deeming the is-
sues of consent irrelevant.111 In February 2013, President Aquino signed
the expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act,112 which strengthens pow-
ers to prosecute those who engage, or attempt to engage, in human traf-
ficking, and provides increased protection for the rights of trafficked
persons.113 In 2004, the Government of Brunei announced the passage of
the Trafficking and Smuggling Persons Order of 2004.114 The means for
procuring trafficking as set out in Section 4 of the Brunei legislation
(threat, use of force or other forms of coercion, etc.) are identical to the
means set out in the Trafficking Protocol.115 In 2005, Myanmar’s Anti-
108. See Lao National Assembly Passes Law to Prevent Human Trafficking, THAI PBS
(Dec. 21, 2015, 9:37 AM), http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/content/143067.
109. At the time of writing, the Laos legislation had not yet been translated into En-
glish, and it was not possible to analyze the extent to which the Laos anti-trafficking legisla-
tion conforms to the provisions of the Trafficking Protocol.
110. The Trafficking Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as “the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of ex-
ploitation.” Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 3(a). Article 3(b) provides that the con-
sent of the victim is irrelevant where the means referred to in Article 3(a) have been used.
For the meaning of “exploitation,” see supra note 58.
111. An Act to Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women
and Children, Establishing the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and
Support of Trafficked Persons, Providing Penalties for Its Violations, and for Other Purposes,
Rep. Act No. 9208, § 3(a), 99:31 O.G. 4916-25 (May 26, 2003) (Phil.).
112. An Act Expanding Republic Act No. 9208, Entitled “An Act to Institute Policies
to Eliminate Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Establishing the Neces-
sary Institutional Mechanisms for the Protection and Support of Trafficked Persons, Provid-
ing Penalties for Its Violations and for Other Purposes,” Rep. Act No. 10364, § 16(d), (July
23, 2012) (Phil.).
113. Michael Lim Ubac, Aquino Signs Expanded Anti-Trafficking Law, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER (Feb. 14, 2013, 4:54 AM), http://globalnation.inquirer.net/64303/aquino-
signs-expanded-anti-trafficking-law.
114. Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons Order (Act No. S 82/2004) (Brunei).
115. Compare Trafficking Protocol, supra note 50, art. 3 (stating the role of coercion in
procuring trafficking as “the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving
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Trafficking in Persons Law was decreed. Again, Myanmar’s legislation sets
out in identical form the prohibited means of procuring persons for the
purpose of exploitation.116 Myanmar’s anti-trafficking law also replicates
the definition of exploitation contained in the Trafficking Protocol.117 In
2007, the Malaysian House of Representatives passed the Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act, which adopts the Trafficking Protocol language regarding
means of trafficking118 and the Trafficking Protocol definition of exploita-
tion.119 The Malaysian Act deems consent to be irrelevant, provides some
measures for the care and protection of trafficked persons, and creates a
high-level Council for Anti-Trafficking in Persons.120 The Act was
amended in 2010 to include the issue of migrant smuggling.121 In 2015,
further amendments were put before Parliament but have not, at the time
of writing, been passed into law.122
In June 2008, Thailand introduced the Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Act,123 which replaces the 1997 Measures in Prevention and Suppression
of Trafficking in Women and Children Act.124 Thailand’s 2008 Act extends
protection to male victims of trafficking, and significantly strengthens the
protection for victims of trafficking. The Thai legislation does not mirror
the Protocol language as precisely as does the legislation of Myanmar,
Brunei, and Malaysia. However, it does contain the essential elements of
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation”), with Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons
Order, supra note 114, sec. 4 (referring to: “(a) threat; (b) use of force or other forms of
coercion; (c) abduction (d) fraud; (e) deception; (f) abuse of power or of a position of vulner-
ability; (g) the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person”).
116. The Anti Trafficking in Persons Law (Act No. 5/2005) § 3(a) (Myan.).
117. See id. (defining ‘exploitation’ as including “receipt or agreement for receipt of
money or benefit for the prostitution of one person by another, other forms of sexual ex-
ploitation, forced labor, forced service, slavery, servitude, debt-bondage or the removal and
sale of organs from the body”).
118. Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act (Act No. 670/
2007) § 13(a)-(h) (Malay.), http://www.agc.gov.my/agcportal/uploads/files/Publications/LOM/
EN/Act%20670.pdf.
119. Id. § 2.
120. Id. §§ 16, 25-26.
121. Id. As a consequence of the 2010 amendment, the Secretariat of the Council for
Anti-Trafficking in Persons was renamed the Secretariat of the Council for Anti-Trafficking
in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants. See Introduction, MALAYSIAN MINISTRY OF
HOME AFFAIRS (last updated May 20, 2016) http://www.moha.gov.my/index.php/ms/?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=164&Itemid=579&lang=en.
122. The 2015 TIP Report discusses the proposed amendments to the Anti-Trafficking
in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act and urges Malaysia to “[s]ign into law and
implement amendments to the anti-trafficking law to allow trafficking victims to travel, work,
and reside outside government facilities, including while under protection orders.” 2015 TIP
REPORT, supra note 9, at 234.
123. The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act (B.E 2551/2008) (Thai.).
124. Measures in Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Women and Children
Act (B.E 2540/1997) (Thai.).
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the Protocol definition of trafficking.125 The same may be said of Cambo-
dia’s Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Sex-
ual Exploitation, passed in 2008.126 In March 2011, Vietnam’s National
Assembly passed the Anti-Human Trafficking Law and introduced a five-
year anti-trafficking plan.127 Until 2015, Singapore’s government contin-
ued to rely on provisions of existing criminal and labor laws to prosecute
traffickers and protect victims.128 However, in 2014, Singapore’s Parlia-
ment passed the Prevention of Human Trafficking Act,129 which adopts
the Trafficking Protocol definition of trafficking130 and provides for a re-
gime of punishments, which include a maximum $100,000 fine, imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding ten years, and caning not exceeding six
strokes.131
Bilaterally, there are a host of agreements and Memoranda of Under-
standing between ASEAN states on the issue of trafficking: for example,
between Lao PDR and Vietnam,132 between Cambodia and Thailand,133
between Lao PDR and Thailand,134 between Cambodia and Vietnam,135
125. The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, (B.E 2551/2008) (Thai.) § 4.
126. Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation (Royal Kram
No. NS/RKM/0208/005/2004) (Cambodia).
127. Law on Human Trafficking Prevention and Combat (Act No. 66/2011/QH12)
(Viet.); Marianne Brown, New Law in Vietnam to Tackle Changing Face of Human Traffick-
ing, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 28, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/new-
law-in-vietnam-to-tackle-changing-face-of-human-trafficking-134671708/168246.html.
128. As the 2013 TIP Report notes, “Singaporean law prohibits some forms of traffick-
ing through its penal code and Women’s Charter.” 2013 TIP REPORT, supra note 6, at 327. In
2012, Singapore’s government implemented a National Plan of Action designed to combat
human trafficking. Id.
129. Prevention of Human Trafficking Act (No. 45/2014) (Sing.).
130. See id. §§ 2, 3(1).
131. Id. § 4.
132. Agreement on Cooperation in Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Persons
and Protection of Victims of Trafficking, Laos-Viet., Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.no-trafficking
.org/reports_docs/legal/lao-viet_ht_mou_en.pdf.
133. Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation for Eliminating Traf-
ficking in Children and Women and Assisting Victims of Trafficking, Cambodia-Thai., May
31, 2003, http://www.no-trafficking.org/resources_laws_regional.html (follow “MOU between
Cambodia and Thailand (Thailand and Cambodia) on Bilateral Cooperation in Eliminating
Trafficking in Children and Women and Assisting Victims of Trafficking 31 May 2003: En-
glish” hyperlink).
134. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Combat Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children, Thai.-Laos, July 13, 2005, http://www.no-trafficking
.org/reports_docs/lao/laws/MOU-Lao-Thailand-Combat-Trafficking-2005-ENG.pdf.
135. Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation for Eliminating Trafficking in Women and
Children and Assisting Victims of Trafficking, Cambodia-Viet., Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.no-
trafficking.org/reports_docs/legal/vietnam/mou_vn_cb_eliminate_tips.pdf.
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between Myanmar and Thailand,136 between Thailand and Vietnam,137
and between Myanmar and China.138 Not all of these agreements include
the definition of trafficking contained in the Trafficking Protocol, but most
provide details about the way that trafficked persons should be treated, for
example, referring to the provision of medical and psychological care, and
these agreements also make reference to the process for their return
home, for example, by specifying a certain time frame. No ASEAN-wide
extradition treaty currently exists, although several ASEAN countries
have signed one with each other.139
At this point, let us return to some of the theories about why states
commit to international human rights norms and then translate their com-
mitments into domestic laws and policies. Theories cluster around three
main ideas. First, many scholars, following the “spiral theory of human
rights” described by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink in The Power of Human
Rights, argue that states act instrumentally in committing to international
human rights norms, rationally balancing the costs and benefits of material
and social sanctions and rewards.140 The central argument of Risse, Ropp,
and Sikkink is that tactical concessions by states (such as treaty ratifica-
tion) provide domestic and international actors with the leverage and lob-
bying power they need to pressure states to give norms prescriptive
status.141 In this way, eventually, the passing of domestic legislation will
follow ratification. In Part V, I argue that the explanation attached to the
first stage of this process—tactical concessions motivated by sanctions and
rewards—provides a plausible explanation for why ASEAN states passed
domestic legislation to prevent trafficking. As I will show, however, this
stage is not necessarily followed by compliance.
There are two other ways in which human rights change is commonly
held to occur. One is where there is a community of states that practice
certain patterns of behavior, and states within that community are en-
couraged to behave in ways that the community deems appropriate.
Where the adoption of international human rights norms is part of this
136. Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Combat Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children, Myan.-Thai., Apr. 24, 2009, http://www.no-trafficking
.org/reports_docs/legal/th_mn_mou_coop_tip_esp_womandchil_en.pdf.
137. Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation for Eliminating Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children and Assisting Victims of Trafficking, Thai.-Viet., Mar. 24, 2008,
http://www.no-trafficking.org/reports_docs/legal/thai_vn_coop_elim_tip_en.pdf.
138. Memorandum of Understanding on Strengthening the Cooperation on Combating
Human Trafficking, Myan.-China, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.notip.org.cn/UserImages/000010
39.pdf.
139. See, e.g., Treaty On Extradition, Thai.-Cambodia, May 6, 1998, http://sithi.org/ad
min/upload/law/Extradition%20Treaty%20between%20the%20Kingdom%20of%20Cambo
dia,%20and%20the%20Kingdom%20of%20Thailand%20(1999).ENG.pdf.
140. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity
Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553, 554-56 (2001).
141. Risse & Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms, supra
note 34, at 18.
636 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:611
pattern, states will, like their peers, also adopt human rights norms.142 This
is connected to, but distinct from, the third process of human rights
change. This is where interaction, social learning, and deliberation about
human rights norms occur among a group of states. The result is that states
gradually redefine the way that they think about themselves and reshape
their interests and preferences.143 The result is a deeper level of commit-
ment and better level of compliance, because norms are developed and
articulated by, and between, a small number of states that share similar
backgrounds, histories, borders, and concerns. We see this occurring, I ar-
gue, in relation to the response of ASEAN states to the issue of trafficking
in persons.
V. RESPONDING TO PRESSURE
The most plausible explanation for why ASEAN states transposed in-
ternational norms into domestic legislation centers on the influence and
effect of the TVPA in encouraging the passage of domestic legislation and
in generating policy measures. The history of Indonesia’s anti-trafficking
measures provides an illustration of the way the TVPA operates in this
regard. In 2001, the United States published its first Trafficking in Persons
Report, placing Indonesia in the Tier 3 category. Indonesia remained in
the Tier 3 category in the 2002 report. On 30 December 2002, through
Presidential Decree Number 88, 2002, Indonesia announced a National
Plan of Action (NPA) to end human trafficking. The NPA references the
specific criticisms made about Indonesia in the 2002 TIP, for example,
“that there is currently not a comprehensive and specific trafficking law in
Indonesia,”144 and lists among its objectives the passage of laws to punish
trafficking and traffickers and the protection of victims of violence, wit-
nesses, and migrant workers.145 The NPA recognizes “the need to ratify
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 and two
associated international protocols related to trafficking in persons in order
to meet international standards” and the need to “synchronize interna-
tional standards on trafficking with national laws through revision of the
Criminal Code, Criminal Procedural Code, Marriage Law, Immigration
Law, and the Law on the Human Rights Tribunal.”146 The NPA adopts a
definition of human trafficking that conforms to the definition contained
142. March & Olsen, supra note 42, at 961.
143. On the variables that affect the state definition of interests and preferences, see
Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. (1994) and Alexander Wendt, The State as Person in International Theory, 30 REV.
INT’L STUD. (2004).
144. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2002).
145. See COORDINATING MINISTRY FOR PEOPLE’S WELFARE, THE ELIMINATION OF
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN INDONESIA 2004-2005 10 (2005), http://www.protectionproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NAP-Indonesia_2004-2005.pdf.
146. See Neha Misra, The National Plan of Action, in TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN INDONESIA 219, 222 (Ruth Rosenberg ed., 2003), http://www.solidaritycenter
.org/files/IndoTraffickingPlan%20of%20Action.pdf.
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in the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons.147 Following these efforts, in the 2003 TIP, Indonesia was placed in
the Tier 2 category.148
By 2006, however, Indonesia had still not passed comprehensive anti-
trafficking legislation and in the view of the United States, had not pro-
vided evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking.149 In 2006, In-
donesia was downgraded to the Tier 2 Watch List.150 Following this, in
April 2007, Indonesia’s President signed into law a comprehensive anti-
trafficking bill.151 In the 2007 TIP, Indonesia was again returned to Tier
2.152 Observers within Indonesia are candid about the fact that Indonesia’s
response to human trafficking has been motivated by the need to escape
sanctions from the United States, such as restrictions on funds not only for
counter-trafficking measures, but also for non-humanitarian and non-trade
aid.153
There are many examples of this kind of responsiveness in Southeast
Asia. In 2010, the Philippines was placed on the Tier 2 Watch List, which,
according to Philippines Vice-President Jejomar C. Binay, placed at risk
“some $700 million worth of non-humanitarian and non-trade related aid
from the US.”154 Legislation to prevent trafficking, including the Philip-
pines Expanded Anti-Trafficking Act (2013), was passed explicitly “to
make the fight against human trafficking more effective, as the country
147. “Trafficking of women and children is any act committed by traffickers, which in-
clude one or more acts of recruitment, domestic and international transportation, transfer,
sending, receiving and temporary harbouring or harboring at destinations – women and chil-
dren – by means of threat, use of verbal and physical force, of abduction, of fraud, of decep-
tion, of the abuse of a position of vulnerability (for example when a person does not have any
other choice, is isolated, addicted to drugs, trapped in debts, et cetera), of giving or receiving
payments or benefits, where the women and children are used for the purpose of prostitution
and sexual exploitation (including pedophilia), of legal as well as illegal migrant work, of
child adoption, of work on fishing platforms, of being rendered as mail-order brides, of do-
mestic work, of begging, of pornography industry, of illegal drug dealings, of organs sale, and
other forms of exploitation.” Presidential Decree No. 88 on the National Plan of Action for
the Elimination of Trafficking of Women and Children (Indon.); see COORDINATING MINIS-
TRY FOR PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 145.
148. 2003 TIP REPORT, supra note 70; see also Chuang, The United States as Global
Sheriff, supra note 22, at 481-82.
149. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 140 (2006) [hereinafter
2006 TIP REPORT].
150. Id.
151. The Eradication of the Criminal Act of Trafficking in Persons (Act No. 21/2007)
(Indon.).
152. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2007) [hereinafter 2007
TIP REPORT].
153. Yuyun Wahyuningrum, Gender Politics in Trafficking Discourses in Indonesia 18
(Paper presented at the International Conference on Mainstreaming Human Security Oct. 4-
5, 2007) (on file with author).
154. Press Release, ASEAN Trade Union Council, ASEAN Convention on Human
Trafficking Sought (July 13, 2011), http://aseantuc.org/2011/07/asean-convention-on-human-
trafficking-sought/.
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remains in the United States State Department’s radar as a venue that
harbors the modern form of slavery.”155 Vice-President Binay stated:
[I]ncreasing the number of anti-human trafficking monitoring
teams in entry and exit points in the country, strengthening anti-
trafficking legislation and speeding up prosecution for trafficking
cases. With all these initiatives in play, Tier 1 classification [fully
compliant with anti-trafficking standards] is more than possible.
Indeed, it is only a question of time.156
The government discourse surrounding the introduction of the 2013
Act was entirely focused on the potential for the new measures to change
the Philippines’ position in the TIP rankings. Introducing the bill, Presi-
dential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda said:
We would like to improve our standing in the watchlist and we
hope that, with this expanded coverage of anti-trafficking, we will
be able to remove ourselves from the watchlist.157
Lacierda also stated:
This is a concern and a priority of our President and this measure
will be enforced by the different agencies, especially by the De-
partment of Justice as well as our police agencies . . . . Over a year
ago we were taken out of that category—Tier 2. [But] we’re still in
the watchlist. We would like to improve our standing in the watch-
list and we hope that, with this expanded coverage of anti-traffick-
ing, we will be able to remove ourselves from the watchlist.158
In Thailand, the Thai government’s Ministry of Social Development
and Human Security, announced on April 3, 2013 the drafting of new anti-
trafficking laws, designed to respond to the fact that:
[T]he United States has placed Thailand in the Tier 2 Watch List
for three consecutive years in the Trafficking in Persons Report of
its Department of State which could affect Thailand’s image. The
image of Thailand’s exports into the American market could also
be affected especially for seafood products which have been de-
termined as products that involve the use of child labour, illegal
foreign workers and human trafficking.159
155. Michael Lim Ubac, Stricter Anti-Human Trafficking Law Signed, PHILIPPINE
DAILY INQUIRER (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/02/13/908396/
stricter-anti-human-trafficking-law-signed.
156. ASEAN Trade Union Council, supra note 154.
157. Angela Casauay, Aquino Signs Expanded Anti-Human Trafficking Law, RAPPLER
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.rappler.com/nation/21727-aquino-signs-expanded-anti-human-
trafficking-law.
158. Ubac, supra note 113.
159. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, Invitation
to Conduct News Reporting and Attend the Press Briefing for the Study Tour of the Diplo-
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Writing specifically in relation to Southeast Asia, trafficking expert
Anne Gallagher claims to have observed “multiple instances in which the
open threat of a negative grade in the U.S. TIP Report provided the impe-
tus for major reform initiatives, including the criminalization of
trafficking.”160
Although several ASEAN states appear to have passed reforms di-
rectly in response to U.S. pressure, there has been caviling (which has
been public, in the case of Singapore) about the lack of transparency and
the subjective methodology employed to rank states into tiers of compli-
ance, and accusations that rankings are based less on empirical evidence
than on the political preferences of the United States.161 Myanmar, for
example, despite passing significant legislation directed at addressing traf-
ficking in persons in 2005, was consistently ranked Tier 3 until 2012, when
it finally achieved a Tier 2 Watch List ranking, This was the same year that
the United States dropped many of its sanctions against Myanmar, and
after Myanmar agreed to a joint plan against trafficking with the United
States.162 Chuang notes that Indonesia achieved a Tier 2 ranking in 2003,
at around the same time that Indonesia became a key U.S. ally in the War
on Terror.163
One of the criticisms of the TIP Reports is that they place significant
emphasis on the number of convicted traffickers, and an increase in the
number of convictions from previous years is viewed as an indicator of a
country’s success in addressing the issue of trafficking.164 For example, in
2004, Laos’ anti-trafficking office reported five convictions for trafficking-
matic Corps, (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/31530-Invitation-
to-conduct-news-reporting-and-attend-th.html.
160. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 50,
at 485. Gallagher further writes: “As explored at various points throughout this book, some
of these responses have been highly problematic in human rights terms, a side effect that is
not explored or even acknowledged by the U.S. Department of State’s reports themselves.”
Id.
161. Xinhua Published, Singapore Urges US to Adopt More Objective Methodology in
Human Trafficking Report, GLOBAL TIMES (June 26, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://www.global-
times.cn/content/791342.shtml. When Russia was downgraded to Tier 3 in 2013, Russia’s For-
eign Ministry was particularly blunt in its assessment of the ranking process. Konstantin
Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry’s plenipotentiary for Human Rights, said in an official state-
ment: “Unfortunately, instead of a deep and objective study into the growing scale of human
trafficking, including in the United States itself, the authors of the report again used the
unacceptable ideological approach that divides nations into rating groups depending on the
US State Department’s political sympathies or antipathies.” Moscow Attacks US Human
Trafficking Report as Politicized and Arrogant, RT (June 20, 2013, 10:20 AM), https://www.rt
.com/politics/trafficking-arrogant-politicized-report-992/.
162. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States – Myanmar Joint Plan on
Trafficking in Persons, (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200675.htm.
163. Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff, supra note 22, at 481-82.
164. See Alese Wooditch, The Efficacy of the Trafficking in Persons Report: A Review
of the Evidence, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 471 (2011); Gallagher, A Shadow Report, supra
note 8, at 531-532.
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related crimes. The 2005 TIP Report placed Laos in the Tier 2 category.165
The following year, Laos reported only one conviction for trafficking. Not-
ing this, that year, the United States placed Laos in the Tier 3 category.166
In 2007, however, the TIP Report lauded the fact that the Lao government
had demonstrated progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts,
reporting twenty-seven trafficking investigations that resulted in the ar-
rests of fifteen suspected traffickers, twelve of whom were prosecuted.
Laos was returned to Tier 2.167 In relation to Thailand, the 2012 TIP Re-
port noted that the Royal Thai Police initiated eighty-three investigations
of trafficking in 2011: sixty-seven for sex trafficking and sixteen for forced
labor, involving 155 suspected offenders and representing an increase from
seventy such investigations in 2010. However, it also noted that investiga-
tions led to only sixty-seven prosecutions in 2011, compared to seventy-
nine prosecutions in 2010. The report also noted that there were twelve
trafficking-related convictions in 2011, a decrease from the previous year’s
eighteen convictions.168 Thailand remained on the Tier 2 Watch List in
2012.
The problem with what Anne Gallagher describes as a “success by
numbers” approach is that it:
[S]erves to discourage the development of longer-term capacities,
systems and processes that are actually required for an effective
criminal justice response. Conversely, it promotes a focus on the
easy wins: the small players who can be identified and appre-
hended much more easily than those who are reaping the real fi-
nancial rewards. The US standards are also silent on the issue of
quality. All prosecutions seem to count, irrespective of their ad-
herence to international criminal justice standards. The absence of
an explicit qualitative element in the crucial area of prosecutions
risks undermining basic rights including the right to fair trial as
dysfunctional, often corrupt, national criminal agencies are called
in to help secure a positive report card.169
The theories to which I have referred draw on individual-level psy-
chology (shame, social status, and material reward) to explain what moti-
vates macro-level state practices. From this perspective, let us consider the
operation of the TVPA in relation to Southeast Asian states.
One of the primary ways that the TVPA operates as an external mo-
tivator is through material inducement and material disincentive. The
problem with material reward or punishment is that it has the potential to
‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation states may have to follow norms for non-
165. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2005).
166. 2006 TIP REPORT, supra note 149.
167. 2007 TIP REPORT, supra note 152.
168. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2012).
169. Gallagher, A Shadow Report, supra note 8, at 531-32.
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material reasons.170 Incentive-based or punishment-based policies suggest
to states that preferred behavior (preventing trafficking, and protecting
the rights of trafficked persons) is “not self-evidently appropriate or that
the broader social environment does not adequately value self-motivated
rule adherence.”171 As Goodman and Jinks argue, if action can be justi-
fied by both normative sentiments and externally imposed material incen-
tives or disincentives, then the result may be a negative effect on the
internalization of norms.172 The reasons are as follows:
First, the purpose of a regime of penalties and incentives is two-fold:
to supply states with a rational reason for pursuing certain behavior and to
supply a signaling effect, indicating that the proscribed behavior is abhor-
rent to a community of actors. In relation to the former, the inference that
is generally drawn from the presence of material incentives or disincen-
tives is that the reason for action is the material incentive, rather than a
state’s moral character or principled beliefs. We see this clearly in the
statements that have emanated from government representatives of the
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, when they have supplied reasons for
their actions in relation to anti-trafficking measures. References to the im-
portance of protecting the human rights of trafficked persons (where any
exist) are almost entirely drowned out by references to the importance of
avoiding negative sanctions from the United States. At a minimum, this
creates confusion: how can one tell whether a government is acting out of
a principled belief about how it ought to behave, or in pursuit of a material
benefit? In relation to the “expressive function” of punishment (as a signal
that the international community condemns the proscribed behavior),
Goodman and Jinks argue that this is diminished if penalties and rewards
issue from actors who have insufficient social standing vis-a`-vis the sig-
naled actors—”a narrow band of donor countries, a remote foreign court,
unrepresentative segments of civil society, a hostile country.”173
Second, Goodman and Jinks argue that over-justification affects self-
perception, causing actors to lose cognitive track of their motives for abid-
ing by a norm. In these circumstances, actors are most likely to attribute
their actions to material incentives. The result is that the strength of intrin-
sic motivation for observing a social norm is lost.174 That is, states that
comply (or would have complied) with a norm because it is an extension
of their identity or internal value system, lose track of this as the reason
for compliance, because of the presence of material reasons. This can de-
lay the final stages of rule-consistent behavior or make it more shallow
and difficult to sustain:
Accordingly, communicative exchanges within a domestic setting
might shift toward the more limited agenda of powerful interna-
170. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 45, at 106.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 110.
174. Id. at 111.
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tional institutions when those institutions promote human rights
through material inducements. One concern is that, had actors
been left to their own devices, a broader and stronger human
rights agenda might have emerged.175
Third, and relatedly, the provision of material incentives often com-
promises a sense of self-determination and degrades intrinsic motivation
for engaging in behavior.176 Goodman and Jinks suggest that where inter-
national coercion through material incentives is considered controlling, ac-
tors resist even normative practices that they would otherwise agree with.
We can see this in the attitude taken by Singapore to the requirements of
the TVPA. Singapore, despite implementing policies designed to prevent
trafficking, refused to pass legislation for this purpose until 2015 and pub-
licly expressed resentment at U.S. attempts to influence its domestic
agenda.177
One might argue that this does not matter much. After all, if states are
not intrinsically motivated to follow certain norms, then it is irrelevant
how they are brought to include human rights norms on the domestic
agenda. What matters is that they do something, regardless of why, or
whether it is the result of coercion. It might also be argued that even if
states are initially spurred to action by crude measures of coercion and
bribery, this may begin a process (of education and reflection) that ends in
genuine acceptance of, and respect for, a particular norm.
One response to such arguments is that the means by which states are
led to adopt different norms does matter, because this affects how deeply
and sincerely norms are promoted and acted upon. Granted, in circum-
stances where there is a blanket rejection of norms and denial that viola-
tions exist, then coercion and bribery that results in even superficial
change might be seen as better than no change at all. But, where intrinsic
motivation does exist, then coercive measures can lead to over-justification
and problems around self-perception and self-determination.
Let us turn then, finally, to the question of whether an autochthonous
regional conception of the importance of preventing trafficking in persons
exists in Southeast Asia. Is there evidence to support the idea that if
ASEAN states “had been left to their own devices, a broader and stronger
human rights agenda might have emerged”?178 Are ASEAN states suffi-
ciently motivated to implement norms about trafficking for non-material
reasons?
In the following section of this article, I describe how ASEAN states
do in fact possess intrinsic motivation for pursuing anti-trafficking norms,
born out of long-standing and deeply held concerns about state sover-
175. Id. at 114.
176. Id.
177. Pearl Lee, Singapore Disputes US Human Trafficking Report, NEWS ASIA ONE
(June 28, 2013), http://news.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1
Story20130626-432511.html.
178. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 45, at 114.
Summer 2016] Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia 643
eignty and the threat posed by the illegal trafficking of persons across bor-
ders; and also, more recently, born out of the work of the region’s
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), which have focused on the
human rights aspects of the practice of trafficking in persons. These rea-
sons for actions are occluded by the discourse around the introduction of
anti-trafficking measures, which focuses on immediate responsiveness to
U.S. threats and TIP rankings.
VI. ASEAN AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
In 2004, the same year that ASEAN states signed the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women,179 and agreed upon the
Vientiane Action Program, which explicitly commits ASEAN to promote
the awareness, education and protection of human rights,180 ASEAN
states signed the ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, Par-
ticularly Women and Children.181 As well as identifying trafficking in per-
sons as a security concern, the Declaration notes the link between social
and economic rights, migration, and vulnerability to trafficking, and, strik-
ingly, draws attention to the “immorality and inhumanity of this common
concern.”182 2004 was also the year that the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Organization passed a Resolution on the role of Parliament in Combating
Trafficking in Women and Children in the ASEAN region.183 The Resolu-
tion noted that “the lack of education, unequal treatment and low status of
women, poverty and unemployment of women, particularly in the
ASEAN region, are major factors contributing to the causes of trafficking
of women and minors.”184
In 2006, ASEAN published its ‘Responses to Trafficking in Persons:
Ending Impunity for Traffickers and Securing Justice for Victims.’185 A set
of guidelines on trafficking in persons, endorsed by the Senior Officials
Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in 2007, provides guidance to
criminal justice practitioners on international cooperation relating to traf-
ficking in persons cases.186 The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission
179. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Re-
gion, June 30, 2004, http://www.asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-elimination-of-vio-
lence-against-women-in-the-asean-region-4.
180. ASEAN, Vientiane Action Program (Nov. 29, 2004), http://www.asean.org/storage/
images/archive/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf.
181. ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women
and Children (Nov. 29, 2004), http://www.asean.org/asean-declaration-against-trafficking-in-
persons-particularly-women-and-children-4/.
182. Id. at pmbl.
183. ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization, Resolution on the Role of Parliament
in Combating Trafficking in Women and Children in the ASEAN Region, Res. 25GA/2004/
Com/WAIPO/02 (Sept. 12-17, 2004).
184. Id.
185. ASEAN, ASEAN RESPONSES TO TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: ENDING IMPUNITY
FOR TRAFFICKERS AND SECURING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS (2006).
186. See Ralf Emmers, ASEAN and the Securitization of Transnational Crime in South-
east Asia, 16 PAC. REV. 419 (2010).
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on Human Rights (AICHR) identified human trafficking as one of the
thematic studies to be undertaken within the first five years of AICHR,
and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) included a focus on victims of
trafficking in its 2012–2016 work-plan.187 In their 2007 Joint Communique´,
ASEAN leaders foreshadowed the development of an ASEAN Conven-
tion on Trafficking in Persons.188 On November 21, 2015, following the
27th ASEAN Summit, the ten ASEAN states signed the ASEAN Conven-
tion on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.189 The
Convention lists its objectives as being: (a) to prevent and combat traffick-
ing in persons, especially against women and children, and to ensure just
and effective punishment of traffickers; (b) to protect and assist victims of
trafficking in persons, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) to
promote cooperation among the parties in order to meet these objec-
tives.190 To this end, as well as to encourage cooperative measures be-
tween states in relation to preventing trafficking and protecting and
repatriating victims of trafficking, the Convention requires parties to
adopt legislative or other measures to establish trafficking in persons as a
criminal offence;191 and to establish comprehensive policies, programs and
other measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and to pro-
tect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from
re-victimization.192
In this final section, I argue that a regional approach to the issue of
human trafficking in Southeast Asia has been generated from the ‘top
down’ by states with similar concerns about sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, and threats to state security; and from the ‘bottom up’, by engage-
ment between and among regional networks of NGOs and NHRIs. The
driving factors behind these two interests in developing a regional ap-
proach to trafficking in persons are entirely different, and because of this,
there is inconsistent and sometimes conflicting emphasis placed on differ-
187. ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, Five-Year Work Plan
of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, (2010–2015); ASEAN, The
ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children
(ACWC) Work Plan (2012–2016) and Rule of Procedure, http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren
.org/sites/default/files/political_declarations/The-ASEAN-Commission-on-the-Promotion-
and-Protection-of-the-Rights-of-Women-and-Children-ACWC-Work-Plan-2012-2016-and-
Rules-of-Procedures-ROP.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). At the time of writing, neither
AICHR nor ACWC have produced any reports or made any investigations related to traf-
ficking in persons.
188. ASEAN, Joint Communique´ of the Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transna-
tional Crime ¶ 7 (2007).
189. ASEAN, The ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/actip/
ACTIP.pdf.
190. Id. art 1(a)-(c).
191. Id. art 5.
192. Id. art 11(1)(a)-(b). The Convention also contains a definition of “trafficking in
persons” that draws heavily on the definition contained in the Trafficking Protocol.
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ent aspects of the issue of trafficking in persons; on the protection of bor-
ders and the prosecution of the crime of trafficking, for example, as
against the protection of the rights of trafficked persons. Nonetheless, di-
vergent interests in eliminating trafficking are broadly congruous with a
regional approach to the problem, and this explains why ASEAN states
have shown increasing willingness to cooperate among themselves on the
problem of trafficking in persons, even to the extent of appearing willing
to subscribe to a legalized regime for addressing the issue. The backdrop
to cooperative efforts is the imminent creation of a single ASEAN eco-
nomic community. In 1997, on the thirtieth anniversary of ASEAN,
ASEAN leaders adopted ‘the ASEAN Vision 2020’, foreshadowing the
community: ten years later, the date for its birth was accelerated to
2015.193
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint envisages, by
2015, the following: (a) a single regional market and production base; (b) a
highly competitive economic region; (c) a region of equitable economic
development; and (d) a region fully integrated into the global economy.
The AEC is expected to transform ASEAN into a region with free move-
ment of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and freer flow of capi-
tal.194 As we have seen, one of the aims stated in the ASEAN Charter is
to alleviate poverty and address the development gap between ASEAN
states.195 The AEC, arguably, will generate economic growth, resulting in
more jobs, improved livelihoods, and an overall reduction in poverty. But,
it also has the potential to accentuate disparities within and between
ASEAN countries and increase relative poverty and inequality, leading to
cross-border migration and trafficking.196
First, let us consider the ‘top down’ perspective of states. Why is traf-
ficking in persons an issue of joint concern to states in Southeast Asia?
One part of the explanation centers on the particular notion of state secur-
ity that prevails in the region. The idea of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘overall se-
curity’, originally coined by Japan in the 1970s, was adopted by Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore a decade later.197 Within the
framework of comprehensive security, national security depends not only
193. ASEAN, Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN
Community by 2015 (Jan. 13, 2007). Each of the ASEAN pillars has its own Blueprint, and
together, these Blueprints form the “Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015.”
194. ASEAN, ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT (2008), http://www.asean
.org/wp-content/uploads/archive/5187-10.pdf.
195. ASEAN, Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 1, ¶ 6 (2007).
196. Phil Marshall, Project Manager of U.N. Inter-Agency Project on Trafficking in
Women and Children in the Mekong Sub-region, Globalization, Migration and Trafficking:
Some Thoughts from the South-East Asian Region (Paper presented at Globalization Work-
shop May 8-10, 2001), http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/marshall_uniap_mekong_2001_
.pdf.
197. Rolfe examines the linkage between national and regional concepts of comprehen-
sive security, and argues that comprehensive security includes political and social stability,
economic development, orderly migration, and the health of the population. See Jim Rolfe,
Pursuing Comprehensive Security: Linkages Between National and Regional Concepts, Some
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on the absence of external military hostility, but also on the presence of
socio-economic development.198 Internal threats as well as external
threats are recognized as having the potential to destabilize the state and
undermine sovereignty. Different ASEAN states developed different per-
ceptions about the nature of these internal threats, based on their different
historical experiences. For example, Malaysia’s concern with societal order
grew out of its experience containing the communist insurgency from 1948
to 1960, and the recognition that its racial and religious cleavages could
lead to dangerous disharmony.199 Indonesia’s concern, shaped by its strug-
gle against Dutch colonialism, focused on the necessity of building a
united Indonesian state.200 For Singapore, a small island state, internal in-
stability was viewed as exacerbating external vulnerabilities.201 The idea of
‘resilience’ took shape among ASEAN’s original members as part of the
political discourse (Malaysia)202 and as part of official policy (keratasan
nasional “national resilience” in Indonesia). In Indonesia’s case, national
resilience consisted of strengthening and developing the nation’s ideologi-
cal, political, economic, socio-cultural, security, and defense capacities.203
As early as 1976, the idea emerged that the stability and internal and
external security of individual states was dependent on the stability of
other states in the region, and that regional resilience and national resili-
ence were interdependent. At the first ASEAN Summit, ASEAN’s five
members declared that, “[t]he stability of each member state and of the
ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and se-
curity. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subver-
sion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.”204
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, agreed upon at
this same meeting, requires ASEAN member states to “endeavour to
strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic,
socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective
ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal
subversive activities.”205
Applications, in CONCEPTUALIZING ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY (Mohamad Jawhar Hassan &
Thangam Ramnath eds., 1996).
198. David Dewitt, Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security, 7 PAC. REV. 1,
3-4 (2007).
199. Muthiah Alagappa, Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries,
in ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 50, 62-63 (Robert A. Scalapino et al.
eds., 1989). Alagappa writes: “[I]nternally the two major security concerns have been the
threat of communist insurgency and the threat of racial and religious extremism.” Id. at 63.
200. Id. at 58-59.
201. Id. at 70-76.
202. Id. at 62-63.
203. Id.
204. ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Feb. 24, 1976) [hereinafter Declaration
of ASEAN Concord], http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-indone-
sia-24-february-1976.
205. ASEAN, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia art. 3 (Feb. 24, 1976);
see Dato Musa Hitam, Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister, Malaysia’s Doctrine of Comprehen-
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Transnational crime—specifically drug trafficking—was identified
early on as a threat to comprehensive security and hence to national and
regional stability.206 Drug addiction and trafficking in drugs and crime
were perceived as indicators of a state’s inability to control its borders, and
thus as signs of a weak state where leaders were unable to maintain social
order.207 Later, in the 1980s, drug trafficking and drug use fed concerns
about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and the views of
some ASEAN member states that AIDS was the result of homosexuality,
prostitution, and heroin use.
In 1983, the Malaysian government officially declared illicit drug traf-
ficking to be a threat to national security.208 In 1988, ASEAN issued a
Joint Declaration in which it stated that the illicit drug trade was a prob-
lem that “could escalate to such a level where perpetrators can pose seri-
ous political and security threats to the region.”209 ASEAN Ministers
argued that “[t]he management of such transnational issues is urgently
called for so that they would not affect the long-term viability of ASEAN
and its individual member nations.”210 In this context, the decision to ex-
sive Security, Speech at the Fourteenth Anniversary Dinner Harvard Club of Singapore
(Mar. 2, 1984), in 17 FOREIGN AFF. MALAYSIA, 1984, at 94, 96 (identifying Malaysia’s doc-
trine of comprehensive security, including “a secure Southeast Asia” and “a strong and effec-
tive ASEAN community” and arguing these goals required adherence to the principle of
non-intervention and “the building of a structure of trust, confidence and goodwill between
the ASEAN states”).
206. Declaration of ASEAN Concord, supra note 204 (calling for “[i]ntensification of
cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the
prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs”).
Subsequently, the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuses of Narcotics
Drugs was adopted in Manila, and this led to some initial proposals in responding to the issue
of narcotics. ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotics
Drugs (June 26, 1976), http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-of-principles-to-
combat-the-abuse-of-narcotics-drugs-manila-26-june-1976.
207. See Zarina Othman, Myanmar, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Security Implications,
65 AKADEMIKA 27 (2004). In relation to Myanmar and Southeast Asia, Othman writes: “Il-
licit trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, and trafficking in weapons
and drugs, has become widespread enough to pose threats to the security and well-being and
security of whole states and regions.” Id. at 28. Othman further writes: “Like the more tradi-
tional and other external security threats, these transnational threats are also capable of un-
dermining law and order and creating devastating political-military, economic and social
impacts.” Id. Emmers notes: “The issue of transnational crime is closely linked to the ques-
tion of national sovereignty. On the one hand, transnational criminal activities represent a
threat to the national sovereignty and integrity of independent states and endanger the sur-
vival of their governments.” Ralf Emmers, Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Is-
sues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia 5 (Institute of Defence and
Strategic Strategy, Working Paper No. 62, 2004).
208. Zarina Othman, Human (In)security, Human Trafficking, and Security in Malaysia,
in TRAFFICKING & THE GLOBAL SEX INDUSTRY 47, 60 (Karen Beeks & Delila Amir eds.,
2006).
209. ASEAN, Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN (July 25, 1998), http://www
.asean.org/?static_post=joint-declaration-for-a-drug-free-asean.
210. ASEAN, Joint Communique´, Twenty-Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (July 20-
21, 1996) § 44 [hereinafter ASEAN Joint Communique´].
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pand the membership of ASEAN in the 1990s to include Myanmar and
Laos, which were major cultivators of opium poppies, led to increased
concern about drug trafficking. At the 1996 meeting of ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, Ministers:
recognized the need to focus attention on such issues as narcotics,
economic crimes, including money laundering, environment and
illegal migration which transcend borders and affect the lives of
the people in the region. They shared the view that the manage-
ment of such transnational issues is urgently called for so that they
would not affect the long-term viability ASEAN and its individual
member nations.211
At a regional conference on transnational crime held in the Philippines in
1997, Philippine President Fidel Ramos declared that “regional security
continues to be assaulted by transnational crime and from time to time
international terrorism.”212
The ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, signed by Heads of
State in 1997, draws attention to “the pernicious effects of transnational
crime . . . on regional stability and development, the maintenance of the
rule of law and the welfare of the region’s peoples,” and recognizes the
need for effective regional modalities to combat these forms of crimes.213
In 1999, ASEAN implemented a Plan of Action to Combat Transnational
Crime, which instituted the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational
Crime (AMMTC) and the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational
Crime (SOMTC), both bodies established to promote cooperation and co-
ordination among ASEAN states in addressing human trafficking (as well
as other transnational crimes).214
Although it had been mentioned earlier, it was not until the early
1990s that trafficking in persons came to be identified as a transnational
crime that had the potential to threaten economic, political, and societal
stability.215 ASEAN’s concern about human trafficking was threefold:
211. Id.
212. President Fidel V. Ramos, Address at the Meeting of ASEAN Ministers of Inte-
rior/Home Affairs (AMIHA) and First Conference to Address Transnational Crimes (Dec.
20, 1997).
213. ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (Dec. 20, 1997), http://www
.asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-on-transnational-crime-manila-20-december-1997.
214. ASEAN, ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (June 23, 1999),
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2012/publications/ASEAN%20Documents%20on%20
Combating%20Transnational%20Crime%20and%20Terrorism.pdf.
215. In July 1996, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting declared that transnational crimes
included drug trafficking and money laundering. ASEAN Joint Communique´, supra note
210. The ASEAN Vision 2020, adopted by ASEAN leaders at the Second Informal Summit
in 1997, foreshadowed the evolution of agreed upon rules of behavior and cooperative mea-
sures to deal with issues such as drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, and
other transnational crimes. The following year, at the ASEAN Summit in December 1998,
ASEAN leaders adopted the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action,’ which began the process of articulating
a platform for collaboration in combating human trafficking. In 1999, Foreign Ministers
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first, it was seen as linked to drug trafficking. For example, Thailand’s gov-
ernment in particular viewed trafficking of drugs and persons from My-
anmar as an immediate threat to its security. Second, it had the potential
to undermine orderly, legal migration, and hence, jeopardize relations be-
tween states, thereby threatening peace and security.216 Third, it was
something that was viewed as having the potential to undermine the moral
foundation of the nation. In relation to this last point, Rizal Sukma re-
counts how in Indonesia, the Islamic-based Justice and Prosperity Party
(PKS) argued that trafficking “disgraced Indonesia’s dignity and identity
as a nation,” giving the impression that Indonesia is “incapable to protect
its citizens and is grouped with countries which have bad records on traf-
ficking in persons.”217 An official at the Indonesian Ministry of Women
Empowerment agreed: “Indonesia is committed to eliminate human traf-
ficking, especially women and children. This is a matter of national dignity
and human rights.”218 Trafficking implies that the state cannot protect its
citizens, particularly its most vulnerable citizens, especially women and
children.219
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis exacerbated poverty and, in Indone-
sia, intensified pressure for political change.220 Thailand, recently demo-
cratic, urged that a solution to these problems was a reconceptualization of
security along the lines of human security, which, it was argued, empha-
sized the needs of individuals and communities rather than the state and
adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime and in 2002, ASEAN
countries agreed on a Work Programme to Implement the Plan of Action. See ASEAN RE-
SPONSES TO TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, supra note 185, at 66–67, 81. See generally Emmers,
supra note 207, at 18.
216. For example, Malaysian-Thai relations were strained by the illegal entry into Ma-
laysia of large numbers of undocumented workers from Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thai-
land. In 2011, Malaysia announced a general amnesty for illegal immigrants to leave the
country without punishment. More than 300,000 illegal workers, mostly from Indonesia, left
Malaysia under the voluntary repatriation program. In September 2013, Malaysia announced
plans to build a security fence along the border that separates Malaysia’s Kelantan state from
Thailand’s Narathiwat province and to strengthen military patrols. Malaysia to Erect Wall
Along River Border, MALAY. TODAY (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.malaysia-today.net/malay-
sia-to-erect-wall-along-river-border; see Emmers et al., supra note 30, at 77.
217. Wahyuningrum, supra note 153, at 16.
218. Rizal Sukma, Different Treatment: Women Trafficking in the Securitisation of
Trans-national Crimes (Paper presented at the Second NTS Convention Nov. 9-11, 2008)
(quoting Indonesia Belum Serius Antisipasi Perdagangan Manusia, DETIKNEWS (Aug. 26,
2004, 5:11 PM), http://news.detik.com/berita/198025/indonesia-belum-serius-antisipasi-perda-
gangan-manusia), http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org/activities/conventions/2008-beijing/rizal.pdf.
219. Id. Sukma writes: “Central to the state-centric perspective or approach is the no-
tion of woman trafficking as a problem that brings about negative implications for the inter-
ests of the state or the nation. In this context, the need to protect national dignity, the
international image of the Indonesian state and the moral foundation of the nation become
the key motivation behind efforts to address the problem of human trafficking.” Id. at 4.
220. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia, 28 ASIAN
PERSP. 155, 173-76 (2004).
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regime security.221 The idea was that poverty, illiteracy, and economic dis-
location lead to violence, rebellion, and instability, all of which threatened
the stability of the region as a whole. Economic development was viewed
as the central plank of domestic stability.222 In 1998, at the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) in Manila in 1998, a Caucus on
Human Security was held and the following year, an ASEAN-PMC Cau-
cus was established on Social Safety Nets. Human security was taken up
with alacrity by ‘track-two’ regional processes such as ASEAN ISIS and
the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. There were some
thirty track-two meetings from 1998 to 2002 that had human security as
the principal focus or a major theme. In the ASEAN Political-Security
Community Blueprint (2009), human trafficking was identified as a “non-
traditional security issue.”223 The Blueprint exhorts states to “further
strengthen criminal justice responses to trafficking in persons, bearing in
mind the need to protect victims of trafficking in accordance with the
ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women
and Children.”224
What I have described above shows the historical pedigree of the issue
of trafficking in persons as a regional concern. There is evidence of state-
led, autochthonous regional conceptions around the importance of
preventing trafficking in persons, as part of a normative framework that
involves the idea of transnational crime as a threat to the survival of the
state.
The emphasis placed on securing the state by preventing crime and
ensuring the integrity of borders does not necessarily translate into con-
cern for protecting the human rights of trafficked persons. Indeed, the
framing of trafficking as a transnational crime and security issue has the
potential to undermine the rights of trafficked persons and elide key as-
pects of the reasons why trafficking occurs. The national dignity rhetoric,
which emphasizes trafficked persons as rights-bearers because they are cit-
izens of the state, and holds the value of these persons to be their role as
emblems of the dignity of the state, is deficient in its failure to appreciate
the nature of trafficking as a rights issue involving the denial of individual
autonomy and self-direction.
In the final part of this section, I argue that there is also evidence of
regional-level concern about trafficking in persons as a distinct human
221. Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Keynote Address Vision 20/20: Strengthening Human Se-
curity in the Aftermath of the Economic Crisis, in THE QUEST FOR HUMAN SECURITY: THE
NEXT PHASE OF ASEAN? 11, 13 (Pranee Thriparat ed., 2001); see Amitav Acharya, Human
Security: East Versus West, 56 INT’L J. 442, 448 (2001).
222. Amitav Acharya & Arabinda Acharya, Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: Puzzle,
Panacea or Peril?, CANCAPS BULL. (2000).
223. ASEAN, ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY BLUEPRINT § B.4.1 (iv)
(2009), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/5187-18.pdf.
224. The 2008 ASEAN Charter establishes the ASEAN Political-Security Council
(APSC) to coordinate the work of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, the ASEAN Law
Ministers Meeting, and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. Id.
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rights issue, caused by economic and social inequity. This concern has
been generated from the ‘bottom-up’ by the region’s national human
rights institutions, by institutions within different states that have a human
rights focus, and by networks of civil society actors.
The 1999 Bangkok Declaration on Irregular Migration (the Bangkok
Declaration), which was agreed upon by ASEAN states (and others) at
the conclusion of an International Symposium on Migration, Towards Re-
gional Cooperation on Undocumented/Illegal Migration, acknowledges
the links between migration, irregular migration, and human trafficking,
notes the complexity of the issue of returning irregular migrants, and rec-
ognizes the human rights dimensions of the problem of trafficking in per-
sons and worker exploitation.225 It explicitly recognizes poverty as a root
cause of trafficking and the need for international cooperation to promote
sustained economic growth and sustainable development in the countries
of origin as a long-term strategy to address irregular migration.226 The
Declaration is, of course, not legally binding, and although the Symposium
recognized the need for a regional mechanism to deal with the problem of
trafficking in persons and migration, the Declaration does not refer to the
creation of an institution to promote, monitor, or enforce its goals.227 The
Bangkok Declaration has been followed by many other Southeast Asian
regional declarations and statements that profess a commitment to ad-
dressing trafficking in persons as a human rights issue.228
It could be argued, of course, that such statements remain at the level
of rhetoric; that ASEAN states are ‘mimicking’ concern for norms priori-
tized by the international community;229 or that these instruments reflect
225. International Symposium on Migration, Towards Regional Cooperation on Irregu-
lar/Undocumented Migration, BANGKOK DECLARATION ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION (1999).
226. The conference was organized by the Government of Thailand in cooperation with
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Office for
Migration, and attended by ministers and government representatives from all ASEAN
states and from other states within the broader Asia Pacific region (Australia, Bangladesh,
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka).
The Bangkok Declaration encourages participating countries to strengthen their channels of
dialogue, to reinforce their efforts to prevent and combat irregular migration by improving
their domestic laws and measures, and to pass legislation to criminalize smuggling of and
trafficking of persons.
227. See generally BHARGAVI RAMARMURTHY ET AL., GLOBALIZING MIGRATION RE-
GIMES: NEW CHALLENGES TO TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION (Joakim Palme & Kristof
Tamas eds., 2006).
228. See ASEAN, ASEAN Leaders’ Joint Statement in Enhancing Cooperation Against
Trafficking in Persons in Southeast Asia (May 8, 2011); ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
art. 13 (2013) (“No person shall be held in servitude or slavery in any of its forms, or be
subject to human smuggling or trafficking in persons, including for the purpose of trafficking
in human organs.”).
229. Mathew Davies, Explaining the Vientiane Action Programme: ASEAN and the In-
stitutionalisation of Human Rights, 26 PAC. REV. 385, 385-406 (2013); Hiro Katsumata,
ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West?, 22 PAC. REV.
619 (2009).
652 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 37:611
the views of international experts who are called in to advise on the draft-
ing of regional statements and declarations.
However, the way these ideas have evolved belies this interpretation.
Prominent in generating a human rights approach to trafficking has been
the region’s NHRIs. In Southeast Asia, NHRIs have been established in
the Philippines (1987),230 Indonesia (1996),231 Malaysia (1999),232 Thai-
land (2001),233 and Myanmar (2011).234 NHRIs are independent institu-
tions created by governments, with a mandate to promote and protect
human rights. They are tasked with critiquing government laws, actions,
and policies that might hinder the realization of human rights or violate
rights. Part of their role is to engage with the United Nations and to pro-
mote its treaties and policies; the other part is to engage with civil society
and government within their own country. NHRIs are positioned, there-
fore, at the intersection between state, society, and the international com-
munity. NHRIs across the Asia Pacific region are linked by a regional
network, the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions
(APF).235 Southeast Asian NHRIs have formed their own sub-network,
the Southeast Asian NHRI Forum (SEANF).236
230. The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines was created pursuant to the
Philippines Constitution of 1987. CONST. (1987), art. XIII § 17 (Phil.). The role and functions
of the Commission are set out in an Executive Order. Exec. Order. No. 163 (1987) (Phil.); see
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, http://www.chr.gov.ph/ (last visited
Aug. 15, 2016).
231. Komnas Ham, the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights, was origi-
nally established by Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia. National Commis-
sion of Human Rights Decree (Presidential Decree No. 50/1993) (Indon.); see KOMISI
NASIONAL HAK ASASI MANUSIA, http://www.komnasham.go.id/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
232. SUHAKAM, the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, was established by Par-
liament under the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act. Human Rights Commission
of Malaysia Act (Act No. 597/1999) (Malay.). The Commission held its first meeting in April
2000. See OFFICIAL PORTAL: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF MALAYSIA, http://www
.suhakam.org.my/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
233. The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand was established under the
National Human Rights Commission Act. National Human Rights Commission Act (Act
B.E. 2542/1999) (Thai.); see NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF THAILAND, http://
www.nhrc.or.th (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
234. The Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was established by the My-
anmar National Human Rights Commission Law. Myanmar National Human Rights Com-
mission Law (Act No. 21/2014) (Myan.); see REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR:
MYANMAR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.mnhrc.org.mm/en/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 15, 2016).
235. See Andrew Byrnes, Andrea Durbach & Catherine Renshaw, Joining the Club:
The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, the Paris Principles, and the
Advancement of Human Rights Protection in the Region, 14 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS. 63
(2008).
236. Catherine Renshaw & Kieren Fitzpatrick, National Human Rights Institutions in
the Asia Pacific Region: Change Agents Under Conditions of Uncertainty, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
STATE COMPLIANCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 150, 150–80 (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Pegram
eds., 2012).
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In 1999, the then High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that
NHRIs are “an under-utilized resource in the fight against trafficking.”237
That same year, Anne Gallagher, Adviser to the High Commissioner on
Trafficking, addressed the APF with a paper called “The Role of National
Institutions in Advancing the Human Rights of Women: A Case Study on
Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific Region.”238 The APF later established a
Trafficking Focal Point Network between member institutions and the
APF. In 2010, all of the then-existing NHRIs in Southeast Asia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding Against Trafficking of Women and Chil-
dren.239 The Memorandum begins with a statement about the principle of
equal worth and dignity of women and children as members of the human
family; adopts the definition of trafficking set out in the Trafficking Proto-
col; and makes detailed recommendations about the protection of victims,
reparations, the provision of legal aid, and the development of victim-cen-
tered standards for dealing with trafficked persons. It exhorts states deal-
ing with trafficking in persons to adopt “an inclusive perspective in its
undertakings,” be accessible to civil society, be guided by the “best inter-
est of the child” principle, and the “right of a woman against discrimina-
tion and gender-based violence in all its forms, particularly trafficking and
exploitation.”240
The concern of the region’s NHRIs for the issue of trafficking in per-
sons was driven very much from the ‘bottom up.’ It is important to con-
sider how this kind of concern arises. As critics of constructivist
approaches to international law and international relations have pointed
out, studies of socialization too often remain at the level of theory, saying
too little about “the actual people who are supposed to be engaged in
‘mimicry,’ worried about being shamed, or seeking to achieve substantial
affective returns (‘cognitive comfort’).”241
An example of the sorts of interactions that lead to the evolution of a
human rights-based approach to trafficking in persons is the visit of the
Human Rights Commissioners from SUHAKAM, the Malaysian Human
Rights Commission, to Kajang Women’s Prison, near the Malaysian capi-
tal Kuala Lumpur, in January 2003.242 During their visit, Commissioners
237. Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights (1999).
238. Anne Gallagher, The Role of National Institutions in Advancing the Human Rights
of Women: A Case Study on Trafficking in the Asia-Pacific Region (Paper presented at the
Fourth Annual Meeting of the Asia Pacific Forum of Human Rights Institutions Nov. 11-12,
2002).
239. Southeast Asia National Human Rights Institutions Forum, Memorandum of Un-
derstanding Against Trafficking of Women and Children, Mar. 30, 2010.
240. Id.
241. See discussion relating to Alvarez’s criticism that “states (or “organizations” in the
abstract) do not “socialize”; people do,” supra note 41.
242. See Catherine Renshaw, Andrew Byrnes & Andrea Durbach, Testing the Mettle of
National Human Rights Institutions: A Case Study of the Human Rights Commission of Ma-
laysia, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 165 (2011) (discussing Sukhakam’s history and impact).
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noticed that a large number of foreign nationals, mainly young girls, were
being held in remand. In conversations with these girls, the Commissioners
heard that many of them had come into the country because they had
been “lured and coerced with promises of jobs as home help, in supermar-
kets or restaurants, with lucrative incomes, but inevitably ended up in the
pernicious flesh trade, often against their will.”243 Many of the girls were
reluctant to tell their stories to officials, for fear of being deported. Dis-
tressed by the plight of these women, the SUHAKAM Commissioners
formed a sub-committee to look into the issue, and the following year or-
ganized a forum on Trafficking of Women and Children—A Cross Border
and Regional Perspective.244 Prior to the forum, they held a series of
roundtable dialogues on the issue of human trafficking, with personnel
from the police, immigration officers, representatives of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Women Development
Ministry, welfare officers, prison officers, representatives from the tourism
ministry, NGOs, the Bar Council, academics, human rights practitioners
and representatives from the embassies of Indonesia, Russia, Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Myanmar. Discussion at
the forum noted the complexities of the causes of trafficking and made
various recommendations: that Malaysia ratify the Trafficking Protocol
(which occurred five years later), that the government pass an Anti-Traf-
ficking Act (passed in 2007) and that the role of NGOs “who operate at
the grass roots level” in combatting trafficking be recognized.245 An im-
portant signal was the message contained in the final written report of the
forum, where SUHAKAM referred to the need to harbor “the political
will of the government and social will of the people/civil society” to pro-
tect “foreign victims of trafficking,” and the state’s duty to “reach out to
victims and send the message that human freedom and dignity will be pro-
tected.”246 The report includes a statement about the nature of human
trafficking as a rights violation which states that:
Traffickers violate the universal rights of all persons to life, liberty
and freedom. It is an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives
of equality and development. Trafficking of women and children
impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women and children of their
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.247
In June 2007, SEANF, then comprising the NHRIs of Malaysia, Thai-
land, Indonesia, and the Philippines, agreed to carry out a series of pro-
grams and activities in relation to five human rights issues of common
concern, one of which was the issue of trafficking in persons. SEANF also
243. TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN: REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COM-
MISSION OF MALAYSIA (SUHAKAM) 6 (2004).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 53 (reporting the details of the April 13-14, 2004 forum).
246. Id. at 60-61.
247. Id. at 4.
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agreed to prioritize encouraging other ASEAN countries to establish
NHRIs, so that they could more effectively engage with other institutions
in cross-border issues of common concern. After Myanmar established its
NHRI in 2011, it also joined SEANF. SEANF agreed to work coopera-
tively with civil society organizations, such as the Coalition Against Traf-
ficking in Women in Asia-Pacific (CATW-Asia-Pacific) and the Global
Alliance against Trafficking in Women (GAATW).248 Since 2009, AICHR
has provided another forum for interaction between different actors
around the problem of trafficking. In November 2013, AICHR hosted a
Regional Workshop on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Combat Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.249 The Workshop dis-
cussed the adoption of a legally binding ASEAN Convention Against
Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) and a Regional Plan of Action to Combat
Trafficking in Persons. The Workshop also highlighted the need “to infuse
the ACTIP with a human rights-based approach.”250
What we see, in summary, among the ASEAN states that have
NHRIs, and perhaps more broadly across the region since the establish-
ment of AICHR, is evidence of the emergence of a shared understanding
of the problem of international trafficking and a shared approach to ad-
dressing the problem. Between some key actors within ASEAN states, we
see increased levels of exchange, both formal and institutionalized, and
informal and voluntary. We also see engagement between actors pursuing
different policy approaches, including the border guards, prosecutors, po-
lice, and NGOs focused on the protection of trafficked victims.251
As Acharya and others have argued, actors in democratic states are
often more inclined to network with actors in other democratic states, and
these networks are more efficient: the exchange of information is better,
levels of trust are higher, and similar goals are pursued.252 These things
are part of what Acharya calls “participatory regionalism.”253 Par-
ticipatory regionalism implies two things. First, it implies acceptance of a
more relaxed view of state sovereignty and the norm of non-interference
in the domestic affairs of states, which permits more discussion of, and
248. See SOUTH EAST ASIA NHRI FORUM, http://seanf.asia/index.php/about-us/89-
south-east-asia-nhri-forum (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
249. The workshop was held in Makati from November 27-28, 2013. See Philippines
Promotes Human Rights-Based Approach to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, in ASEAN, REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 29,
2013), https://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/1501-philippines-
promotes-human-rights-based-approach-to-combat-trafficking-in-persons-especially-women-
and-children-in-asean.
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., MYANMAR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://mnhrc
.org.mm/en/field-and-investigation-trips/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) (relating to the Field and
Investigation Trips).
252. See Amitav Acharya, Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Region-
alism in Southeast Asia, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 375 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interna-
tional Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 503 (1995).
253. See Acharya, supra note 252.
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action on, problems facing the region and creates more space for non-
government actors in the decision-making process.254 Second, it implies a
“close[r] nexus between governments and civil society in managing re-
gional and transnational issues.”255 The result is greater domestic discus-
sion and debate over foreign policy goals, higher levels of transparency,
increased availability of information, greater levels of openness, under-
standing and trust between states, a greater space for civil society, and
greater willingness on the part of states to be accommodating to the con-
cerns of civil society. All of these things increase the likelihood that states
will respond to demands for regional solutions to problems such as the
environment, refugees, trafficking in persons, and migration, and allow re-
gional institutions to address sensitive issues.
It remains to be answered why trafficking persists, in the face of what
I argue is the apparent legitimacy of the regional anti-trafficking norm
among both states and civil society actors in Southeast Asia, and despite a
plethora of domestic legislation directed towards ending the practice of
trafficking that exists across the region. There are several explanations.
First, and most obviously, there is limited state capacity and resources, and
the underlying causes of trafficking, including, for example, poverty, do-
mestic instability and corruption, are intractable. Regional bodies such as
the ASEAN Secretariat have only limited capacity and resources to coor-
dinate member states’ actions. Second, there is also the influence of non-
state actors, such as the multinational companies that employ irregular mi-
grants and trafficked persons.
Finally, there remain entrenched proclivities that augur against coop-
erative efforts. Concerns about state sovereignty and patterns of non-co-
operative behavior stymie the effectiveness of regional approaches. The
2004 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, for example,
which places the issue of trafficking within the context of ASEAN’s efforts
to address transnational crime, declares an urgent need for a “comprehen-
sive regional approach” to addressing the problem.256 Yet it also contains
a ‘claw-back’ provision relating to any cooperative efforts, in the form of a
statement that only “to the extent permitted by their respective domestic
laws and policies need concerted efforts be taken to effectively address the
problem.”257
254. Id. at 382.
255. Id.
256. ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Chil-
dren, supra note 181, pmbl. (“[Reaffirming] the Ha Noi Declaration of 1998 and the Ha Noi
Plan of Action, which, among others, committed to intensify individual and collective efforts
to address transnational crimes, including the trafficking in person[s].”). The ASEAN Decla-
ration on trafficking also refers to “ASEAN’s unwavering desire to embrace the spirit behind
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its relevant pro-
tocols” even though at the time of signing only Laos and the Philippines had ratified the
Trafficking Protocol. Id.
257. Id.
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What cannot be discounted, however, in answering why trafficking
persists, is the distorting effect of the U.S. regime to end trafficking, which
undermines regional normative commitment and pushes states towards su-
perficial and unilateral efforts to end trafficking. The U.S architecture to
end trafficking in persons, particularly the TVPA, has made the progress
of ASEAN states towards preventing trafficking in persons slower and
more uneven than it might otherwise have been, and has undermined an
inchoate, genuinely autochthonous regional approach to the human rights
problem of trafficking in persons.
CONCLUSION
The broad point made in this Article is that it matters whether or not
law reflects the social reality with which it is supposed to deal, and it mat-
ters how law is brought into being. My argument has been that the global
approach to human trafficking, applied in Southeast Asia, lacks legitimacy.
In the first place, it does not adequately reflect the social reality of the
practice of human trafficking in Southeast Asia. This is because both the
Trafficking Protocol and the TVPA are based on certain assumptions
about the practice of trafficking that do not match the particularities of the
practice in the region. One of these assumptions is that what defines traf-
ficking, and distinguishes it from practices such as migration and people
smuggling, is the element of coercion: trafficked men, women, and chil-
dren do not choose to move or be moved, or would not so choose if they
were apprised of the conditions that awaited them at their destination.
This is partly tied to the idea that human trafficking is about sexual ex-
ploitation and that all sexual commerce involves exploitation.258 The real-
ity in Southeast Asia is that the circumstances of poverty and economic
deprivation complicate notions of coercion in ways that law has difficulty
responding to. Another assumption is that the perpetrators of trafficking
are involved in large-scale criminal enterprises and that their victims are
usually unknown to them. But, there is no compelling evidence that this is
the case in Southeast Asia, and crime control measures designed to detect
and prevent this kind of crime expend the scarce resources of states. A
final assumption is that borders are logical political and geographical di-
vides between states, and that policing borders is the best way to prevent
trafficking. Again, this is not the case in Southeast Asia. Borders are not
accepted as logical divides in many parts of Southeast Asia, nor are people
within borders necessarily ‘citizens’ who enjoy the protection of the state.
Second, the global regime lacks legitimacy because of the unilateral
actions of the United States under the TVPA, and the influence of the TIP
Reports. It is difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish which of a state’s
anti-trafficking efforts flow from a commitment to fulfill obligations under
the Trafficking Protocol, which flow from a state’s fear of reprisals from
258. Id.; see Julia O’Connell Davidson, New Slavery, Old Binaries: Human Trafficking
and the Borders of ‘Freedom’, 10 GLOBAL NETWORKS 244 (2010); Ronald Skeldon, Traffick-
ing: A Perspective from Asia, 38 INT’L MIGRATION J. 7 (2000).
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the United States under the TVPA, or which flow from a genuine and
principled commitment to ending the practice of trafficking. As we have
seen, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand often explicitly explain do-
mestic efforts to address trafficking in terms of a response to the U.S. TIP
Reports. Singapore, in contrast, which has still not signed the Trafficking
Protocol, but which has nonetheless put in place measures to combat traf-
ficking, does not concede that its actions are in any way a response to its
ranking in the TIP Reports. What is clear is that the TIP confuses and
distorts public and self perceptions about states’ responses to human
trafficking.
Why is this a problem? After all, the approach to human trafficking
promoted by the U.N. is a web of interlocking and complementary laws
and policies at the domestic, regional, and international levels.259 Why
could the coercive measures of the United States not be complementing
other processes, such as socialization among states within the region?
One answer to this is that explicit incentive-based policies in the
TVPA suggest that preventing trafficking, and protecting the human rights
of trafficked persons, is not self-evidently appropriate to ASEAN states.
This directly affects the way the problem is perceived, the way responses
are interpreted and the way that legislation is implemented and enforced
on the ground. Another answer is that incentive-based policy suggests that
the broader social environment does not adequately value self-motivated
rule adherence. In any regard, the net effect is to diminish the value of
principled pursuit of a policy. It is impossible to determine what propor-
tion of the failure of trafficking policy in Southeast Asia can be attributed
to the influence and effect of the TVPA, but I suggest that it is significant.
As well as sketching the contours of the unilateral approach and its
effects in Southeast Asia, this Article has charted the emergence of a re-
gional approach to addressing the issue of trafficking in persons. As we
have seen, this approach is formed by multiple and somewhat conflicting
patterns of response to the issue of trafficking in persons. The most obvi-
ous regional response focuses on trafficking in persons as a security issue
of concern to states because it is a potential threat to national and regional
stability. But, I also plot out another response, generated bottom-up from
the experience of actors (NHRIs) brought into contact with the issue of
human trafficking in direct ways, which contributes to shaping a distinct
human rights approach to the issue of trafficking in persons. Below these
broad levels of response, there are other complexities and contradictions
in the regional vision. For example, it is possible to distinguish between the
approach and attitude of ASEAN’s more democratic states, and those that
are less so; and between the concerns and preoccupations of ‘sending’ as
compared to ‘receiving’ states.
The argument is that given the nature and scope of the issue, and con-
siderations of geography, socio-cultural understandings between states,
259. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], General Assembly Reviews Efforts to
Combat Human Trafficking (May 13, 2013), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/
May/general-assembly-reviews-efforts-to-combat-human-trafficking.html.
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and levels of interaction between rule-makers and administrators in differ-
ent states, the appropriate level for managing the issue of trafficking in
persons is the regional one. Furthermore, we can see the emergence of a
regionally based, multilateral response to the issue of human trafficking,
where the parameters of the problem of human trafficking in Southeast
Asia are defined not only as an issue of security, but also as an issue of the
violation of individual rights. This is taking place incrementally, through a
process that engages many domestic institutions and the regional networks
that operate between them, and which through interaction and engage-
ment, generate a shared regional understanding about the nature of the
problem and the parameters of a solution. There is evidence of moral con-
sciousness-raising, argumentation and persuasion among regional peers,
by national and regional actors, both governmental and non-governmen-
tal, coupled with the alignment of interests among states that share instru-
mental reasons for advancing a particular joint project. What emerges
from this is a specifically regional understanding of the problem of traf-
ficking that is particularly well suited to promoting the internalization of
norms about preventing trafficking. The 2004 ASEAN Declaration
Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women and Children and the
ASEAN Convention on Trafficking in Persons (currently being negoti-
ated) are reflections of this regional vision.
